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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 54 NOVEMBER 1955 No. I 
GRAY VS. POWELL AND THE SCOPE OF REVIEW 
Bernard Schwartz* 
IN dissenting from the decision of the Supreme Court in a cele-brated administrative-law case, Justice Jackson once declared: 
"I give up. Now I realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he 
said, 'The more you explain it, the more I don't•understand it.' "1 
It cannot be denied that the learned justice's reaction is one which 
is often felt by students of Supreme Court jurisprudence. This 
has been particularly true of the field involved in the case which 
called forth Justice Jackson's plaint-i.e., that of administrative 
law. American administrative lawyers have not infrequently had 
this same response to decisions of the highest tribunal. 
Among Supreme Court administrative-law decisions, few have 
been better calculated to produce such response among the legal 
profession than those involving the doctrine usually associated 
with the case of Gray v. Powell.2 That doctrine, as we shall see, 
is one which is of basic importance in the law of judicial review 
of agency action, for it drastically narrows the role of the review-
ing court with regard to questions that appear to be more legal 
than factual in nature.3 What makes the doctrine especially dif-
ficult for students of administrative law, however, is the fact that 
the Supreme Court has been (to put it mildly) inconsistent in 
its application. There have been many cases since the doctrine 
of Gray v. Powell was first enunciated, which would seem to be 
governed by it, where the Court has simply not applied the doc-
trine. And, to make matters worse, the Court, in many of them, 
has not seen fit to tell us why it was acting as it did or even, for 
that matter, to mention the doctrine of Gray v. Powell at all. This 
has led, not unnaturally, to the belief that the Court in this field 
• Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Comparative Law, New York 
University.-Ed. 
1 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 at 214, 67 S.Ct. 
1575 (1947). 
2 314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326 (1941). 
3 The expression used by Murphy, J., in Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 
469 at 478, 67 S.Ct. 801 (1947). 
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has been guided by purely discretionary factors - or, more bluntly, 
by the arbitrary whims and caprices of the majority of the justices. 
As one commentator expresses it, "The one statement that can be 
made with confidence about applicability of the doctrine of Gray 
v. Powell is that sometimes the Supreme Court applies it and 
sometimes it does not. The criteria that guide the use or non-use 
of the doctrine are exceedingly elusive. Many cases defy explana-
tion except in terms of judicial discretion."4 
To the student of administrative law, the unexplained vagaries 
of the Supreme Court in its application of the doctrine of Gray 
v. Powell are most disturbing. The life of the law may not be 
logic, but a legal system that is not logically consistent internally 
leaves much to be desired. Whatever one may think of the merits 
of the doctrine of Gray v. Powell, its application should be a con-
sistent one. If, on the contrary, that doctrine is sometimes applied 
and sometimes not,5 in cases that appear to be fundamentally alike, 
then the law on· the subject is far from satisfactory. The evil 
resulting from the high Court's inconsistency in applying a sup-
posedly established doctrine is self-evident. If the application of 
such doctrine in particular cases depends solely upon judicial 
fancy, the law becomes, as Justice Roberts once expressed it, not 
a chart to govern conduct, but a game of chance; instead of settling 
rights and liabilities it unsettles them. Counsel and parties will 
bring actions in the teeth of the accepted doctrine on the not 
improbable chance that the doctrine will be thrown overboard. 
Defendant agencies will not know whether to litigate or to settle 
review actions, for they will have no assurance that the declared 
rule will be followed. "But the more deplorable consequence will_ 
inevitably be that the administration of justice will fall into dis-
repute. Respect for tribunals must fall when the bar and the 
public come to understand that nothing that has been said in 
prior adjudication has force in a current controversy.''6 
It is these implications of the Supreme Court jurisprudence 
that have led the present writer to undertake, in this paper, a 
reexamination of the doctrine of Gray v. Powell. The primary 
concern in doing this is to determine whether or not the inconsis-
. tencies of the Court already referred to in applying that doctrine 
can be explained (at least in most cases) upon a rational basis. 
4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 893 (1951). 
old. at 887. 
6 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 at 112, 64 S.Ct. 455 (1944). 
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But before such determination can be attempted, it is necessary 
first to ascertain just what doctrine it was that the highest Court 
enunciated in Gray v. Powell and what the effect of that doctrine 
has been upon the scope of judicial review of administrative ac-
tion. 
Doctrine of Gray v. Powell 
Gray v. Powell1 arose out of a petition to review an order of the 
Director of the Bituminous Coal Division of the Department of 
the Interior. Petitioners were the receivers of the Seaboard Air 
Line Railway Company and as such were the holders of coal 
leases on certain coal lands in Virginia and West Virginia from 
which they were having coal mined by independent contractors. 
The coal thus mined was used by petitioners in the operation of 
the interstate railway system of which they were receivers. The 
receivers, as producers of coal, filed an application under the 
relevant section of the Bituminous Coal Act8 asking', that they be 
held exempt from the price-fixing provisions of the act by reason 
of the exemption contained therein, to the effect that such pro-
visions "shall not apply to coal .consumed by the producer or to 
coal transported by the producer to himself for consumption by 
him." The receivers asserted that they were producer-consumers 
within this provision and hence entitled to exemption from the 
act. The director held that they were not "producers" consuming 
their own product and issued an order denying the claimed ex-
emption. It was this order that the receivers sought to have re-
viewed. 
The Court of Appeals for the- Fourth Circuit reversed the 
agency order, declaring that "the decision of the Director is not 
supported by substantial evidence and is based upon error of law."9 
According to Circuit Judge Parker, the petitioners clearly were 
"producers" of coal within the meaning of the exemption provi-
sion of the Coal Act. "For the purpose of the Act, we cannot 
see what difference it makes whether the owner of a mine digs 
the coal himself with his own organization or whether he has it 
dug for him by an independent contractor, who assumes the risks 
and responsibilities of that relationship. In either event, the owner 
causes the coal to be mined and prepared for use .... If he sells 
7 314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326 (1941). 
8 50 Stat. L. 72, c. 127 (1937). 
9 Powell v. Gray, (4th Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 752 at 757. 
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it, he should certainly be held subject to the regulatory provisions 
of the Act; and if he consumes instead of selling it, there is as 
much reason for exempting him from the regulatory provisions 
in the one case as in the other."10 Since the agency construction 
of the relevant statutory provision was, in the opinion of the court, 
erroneous, its order could not stand. 
That the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court 
of appeals is less important than the reasons given for the Court's 
action. Review of the agency conclusion that petitioners were not 
producers is not to be based, as was the decision below, upon in-
dependent judicial determination of whether they came within 
the statutory term. Instead, said Justice Reed, "In a matter left 
specifically by Congress·to the determination of an administrative 
body, as the question of exemption was here . . . , the function 
of review placed upon the courts . . . is fully performed when 
they determine that there has been a fair hearing, with notice and 
an opportunity to present the circumstances and arguments to the 
decisive body, and an application of the statute in a just and 
reasoned manner."11 
An agency determination like that at issue "belongs to the 
usual administrative routine."12 Congress could itself have legis-
lated specifically as to individual exemptions, but instead dele-
gated that job to the administering agency. "Where, as here, a 
determination has been left to an administrative body, this dele-
gation will be respected and the administrative conclusion left 
untouched. Certainly, a finding on Congressional reference that 
an admittedly constitutional act is applicable to a particular situa-
tion does not require such further scrutiny. Although we have here 
no dispute as to the evidentiary facts, that does not permit a court 
to substitute its judgment for that of the Director."13 
The sweep of the statutory term "producer," said Justice Reed, 
must be left to the administrative agency. As in most cases, the 
application of that term in a particular case is a matter of degree. 
"The separation of production and consumption is complete when 
a buyer obtains supplies from a seller totally free from buyer con-
nection. Their identity is undoubted when the consumer ex-
tracts coal from its own land with its own employees. Between 
10 Id. at 756. 
11314 U.S. 402 at 411, 62 S.Ct. 326 (1941). 
12Ibid. 
13 Id. at 412. 
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the two extremes are the innumerable variations that bring the ar-
rangements closer to one pole or the other of the range between 
exemption and inclusion. To determine upon which side of the 
median line the particular instance falls calls for the expert, ex-
perienced judgment of those familiar with the industry. Unless 
we can say that a set of circumstances deemed by the Commission14 
to bring them within the concept 'producer' is so unrelated to the 
tasks entrusted by Congress to the Commission as in effect to 
deny a sensible exercise of judgment, it is the Court's duty to 
leave the Commission's judgment undisturbed."15 
Such, briefly stated, was the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Gray v. Powell. Its importance lies in the Court's statement with 
regard to the scope of review of the administrative finding that 
the petitioners were not "producers" within the exemption pro-
vision of the relevant statute. The court of appeals had decided 
that the agency had erred in its finding; in its opinion, those in 
petitioners' position clearly were "producers" of coal consuming 
their own product, even though the actual mining was carried on 
by independent contractors. A similar position was taken in the 
Supreme Court by three dissenting justices. According to Justice 
Roberts, who delivered the dissenting opinion, "This court ob-
viously fails in performing its duty and abdicates its function 
as a court of review if it accepts, as the opinion seems to do, the 
Director's definition of 'producer' and then proceeds to accommo-
date the meaning of related provisions to the predetermined defini-
tion. So to do is a complete reversal of the normal and usual 
method of construing a statute."16 Where the agency construction 
of the term "producer" is erroneous, it is the duty of the review-
ing court to reverse its order. And, said Justice Roberts, that was 
the case here. The agency finding was based upon the fact that 
the coal in question was mined for it by people not its employees. 
But, in the view of the dissenters, this made no difference. "The 
only possible differentiation between the respondents' method of 
conducting the business and that of the usual captive mine lies in 
the fact that the respondents' coal is mined by an independent 
14 It should be noted tbat tbe agency in Gray v. Powell before whom tbe hearing was 
originally held was tbe National Bituminous Coal Commission. While tbe case was pend-
ing, it was abolished by presidential reorganization plan and its functions transferred to 
tbe Bituminous Coal Division, headed by a director, set up in tbe Department of tbe 
Interior. This explains why Justice Reed, in tbe quoted portions of his opinion, refers 
both to the "director" and the "commission." 
15 314 U.S. 402 at 413 (1941). 
16 Id. at 420-421. Stone, C.J., and Byrnes, J., joined in the dissent. 
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contractor instead of by employes. That circumstance, however, 
will not justify the statement that respondents do not produce the 
coal, any more than it would justify the statement that they would 
not transport coal to themselves, within the meaning of the Act, 
if they shipped it by a common carrier who was an independent 
contractor. The circumstance that the coal is mined by a con-
tractor instead of an employe, or transported by a common carrier, 
cannot have any more, or any different, effect upon the subjects 
of regulation - prices and unfair methods of competition - in the 
one case than in the other."17 
Both the decision of the court of appeals and the diss~nt in the 
Supreme Court indicate that the Director of the Bituminous Coal 
Division may well have been wrong in giving to the term "pro-
ducer" the meaning which he had. In the opinion of the majority 
of the Supreme Court, however, it does not follow from this that 
his decision must necessarily be reversed. For Gray v. Powell stands 
for the proposition that the test upon review is not the rightness 
of the challenged administrative finding, but only its reasonable-
ness. 
In Gray v. Powell itself, it is at least arguable that the agency 
determination was not right. The Court expressly stated that 
that was not its concern upon review. The reviewing court can 
reverse only when it "can say that a set of circumstances deemed 
by the Commission to bring them within the concept 'producer' 
is so unrelated to the tasks entrusted by Congress to the Commis-
sion as in effect to deny a sensible exercise of judgment."18 In 
such a case, it would seem that the administrative finding is not 
only not right, but also not reasonable. Where, on the contrary, 
the agency determination, though perhaps erroneous in the view 
of the reviewing court, is a reasonable one, "it is the Court's duty 
to leave the Commission's judgment undisturbed."19 It may be 
going too far to assert, as did Justice Roberts in his dissent, that 
the majority of the Court adopted its construction of the term 
"producer" "apparently only because the Director has adopted 
it,"20 but it is certainly true that, under the Court's reasoning, 
it could not substitute its judgment for that of the director on 
the proper construction of the statutory term. Even if the Court 
11 Id. at 421. 
18 Id. at 413. 
l9Ibid. 
20 Id. at 422. 
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would have construed the term differently had the matter been 
before it originally for decision upon its own independent judg-
ment, it had to accept the agency construction, provided only that 
it did not pass the bounds of reason. 
Gray v. Powell thus lays down the doctrine that, on review, an 
administrative construction of a statutory term like "producer" 
will be upheld if it is rational even though the court might well 
have construed the term differently on its own independent judg-
ment. Chief Justice Vinson, in a later case applying the Gray v. 
Powell doctrine, explained: "To sustain the Commission's ap-
plication of this statutory term, we need not find that its con-
struction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result 
we would have reached had the question arisen in the first in-
stance in judicial proceedings. The 'reviewing court's function 
is limited.' All that is needed to support the Commission's inter-
pretation is that it has 'warrant in the record' and a 'reasonable 
basis in law.' "21 
Scope of Review 
To enable the reader adequately to understand the effect of 
Gray v. Powell upon the law of judicial review of administrative 
action, an introductory word must first be said about the scope 
of review as it had been developed before the doctrine of that 
case was articulated. 
The question of the scope of review has been a crucial one in 
American administrative law. Until a comparatively recent time, 
indeed, the issue of proper scope was a highly controversial one. 
But now, as Professor Davis puts it: "The long debate about de 
novo review versus restricted review is about ended; the Ben 
Avon and Crowell cases are of little interest except as history; 
extremists have moved from both ends toward the middle; and the 
substantial-evidence rule now dominates nearly all judicial review 
of administrative action in the federal courts."22 
The fact that present-day discussions of the scope of review are 
no longer dominated by the heat of partisan controversy does not, 
however, mean that that question is now of only academic im-
portance. The revelation by Professor Davis of his own mental 
21 Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 at 
153-154, 67 S.Ct. 245 (1946). 
22 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 868 (1951). The cases referred to by Professor Davis are 
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 S.Ct. 527 (1920), and 
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285 (1932). 
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processes in writing up the subject for his treatise on administra-
tive law is highly significant in this respect. "The easy supposi-
tion," he has stated, "was that the book ... would include a 
mere summary of the law concerning scope of review. But the 
preparation of what started out to be such a summary has led to 
the surprising discoveries that the heart of the scope-of-review 
problem as of 1950 is inadequately treated by the literature and 
that few branches of administrative law are more challenging."28 
The basic importance of scope of review lies in the fact that 
the extent of judicial inquiry in particular cases may determine 
whether or not full effect is given to the legislative purpose in 
creating administrative agencies. "One of the principal reasons 
for the creation of such agencies is to secure the benefit of special 
knowledge acquired through continuous experience in a diffi-
cult and complicated field.''24 If the review of administrative 
determinations were to be very broad, with the reviewing court 
deciding the case de novo on its independent judgment, "admin-
istrative tribunals would be turned into little more than media 
for transmission of the evidence to the courts. It would destroy 
the values of adjudication of fact by experts or specialists in the 
field involved. It would divide the responsibility for administra-
tive adjudications.''25 
We should not forget that "in the whole of administrative law 
the functions that can be performed by judicial review are fairly 
limited.''26 The role of the courts in this field "is to serve as a 
check on the administrative branch of government - a check a-
gainst excess of power and abusive exercise of power in derogation 
of private right.''27 The judicial fun~tion is thus one of control: 
we can expect judicial review to check - not to supplant - ad-
ministrative action. The province of the judge is to confine the 
administrator within t~e bounds of legality, not to determine for 
himself the wisdom of challenged administrative action. 
At the same time, the limitations imposed on the scope of 
inquiry of the reviewing court must not go so far as to prevent full 
judicial scrutiny of the question of legality. If that question can-
not be properly explored by the judge, the right to judicial review 
28 Davis, "Scope of Review of Federal Administrative Action," 50 CoL. L. REv. 559 
(1950). 
24 SEC v. Associated Gas and Electric Co., (2d Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 795 at 798. 
25 REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITfEE ON .ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 91-
92 (1941). 
26Id. at 76. 
27Ibid. 
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can become but an empty form. "It makes judicial review of ad-
ministrative orders a hopeless formality for the litigant. . . . It 
reduces the judicial process in such cases to a mere feint."28 
Law-fact distinction. The scope of review of administrative 
action has been dominated by the distinction between "law" and 
"fact" - a distinction that is fundamental throughout our law 
and that has, indeed, been the keystone upon which our whole 
system of appellate review has been built. As an English adminis-
trative lawyer put it, in this field, "it is generally agreed that the 
jurisdiction of superior Courts should be invoked only on ques-
tions of law - a principle which is already familiar in other 
spheres, such as appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeal and cases 
stated to the High Court by justices and other authorities of in-
ferior jurisdiction. To re-open all disputed issues of fact might 
lead to endless litigation, with no very satisfactory conclusion in 
the end."29 As applied to the field of administrative law, this 
separation of law and fact sounds attractively simple. "The ad-
ministrative tribunal would find the facts and the courts would 
not interfere unless the absence of evidence or the perversity of 
the finding required them to intervene."30 
The approach of our courts to the scope of review has been 
based almost entirely upon the distinction between questions of 
law and questions of fact. As to the latter, the primary responsi-
bility of decision is with1the administrative expert. It is only the 
former that are to be decided judicially. "If the action rests upon 
an administrative determination - an exercise of judgment in an 
area which Congress has entrusted to the agency - of course it 
must not be set aside because the reviewing court might have 
made a different determination were it empowered to do so. But 
if the action is based upon a determination of law as to which the 
reviewing authority of the courts does come into play, an order 
may not stand if the agency has misconceived the law."31 
From a historical point of view, the use of the law-fact distinc-
tion in the field of review of administrative action was a wholly 
natural development. When Anglo-American courts came to be 
confronted with cases involving challenges to the legality of agency 
28 Jackson, J., dissenting, in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 at 210, 67 S.Ct. 1575 
(1947). 
29 Au.EN, LAW AND ORDERS 159 (1945). 
30 CARR, CONCERNING ENGLISH Anl\UNISTRATIVE LAW 108 (1941). 
31 SEC v. Chenery Corp.; 318 U.S. 80 at 94, 63 S.Ct. 454 (1943). 
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acts, they had at their disposition the fully developed law of ap-
pellate review of lower courts as well as that governing the re-
spective roles of judge and jury - both of which were grounded 
entirely on the law-fact distinction. In evolving the law of agency 
review, it was not suprising that our judges proceeded, so far as 
possible, by analogy with the principles that had been constructed 
so meticulously by their predecessors in the above-mentioned :fields, 
and particularly that of appellate court review. In their origins, 
indeed, cases involving review of agency action by the Court of 
King's Bench appear to have been treated exactly like cases involv-
ing review of inferior courts by that tribunal. The prerogative ·writs 
themselves, which became the basic non-statutory method of secur-
ing review of administrative acts in the common-law world,32 
were originally available only to control inferior courts.33 When 
those same writs began to be used as a means of controlling admin-
istrative agencies, it was natural for them to be governed by the 
rules that applied when they were issued against lower courts -
including that limiting the scrutiny of the reviewing court to 
questions of law. 
The law-fact distinction, whose penetration into the law of 
review of administrative action can thus be explained historically, 
may also be said to have a significant practical basis in the :field of 
administrative law. A theory of review grounded upon the dis-
tinction rests upon a division of labor between judge and adminis-
trator, giving full play to the particular competence of each. 
Questions of law are to be decided judicially; for the judge, both 
by training and tradition, is best equipped to deal with them. 
"Our desire to have courts determine questions of law is related 
to a belief in their possession of expertness with regard to such 
questions."34 These considerations do not apply to the judicial 
review of the factual issues arising out of administrative determina-
tions. Thei::e, the advantages of expertise are with the adminis-
trator. The fact ":findings of an expert commission have a validity 
to which no judicial examination can pretend; the decision, for 
instance, of the New York Public Service Commission that a gas 
32 Under Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U.S. 162, 33 S.Ct. 639 (1913), it should be noted, 
certiorari, the most commonly used of the prerogative writs in this field, is not available 
in the federal courts for the review of administrative action. 
33 See Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, [1924] 1 K.B. 171 at 205. 
34 LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 152 (1938). Emphasis omitted. 
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company ought to provide gas service for a given district is al-
most inevitably more right than a decision pronounced by the 
Courts in a similar case."35 
Review of facts. The division of labor just referred to is not, 
however, inexorably carried out, for constitutional principles re-
quire some judicial review upon fact as well as law. "An approach 
to the problem of judicial review cannot neglect the fact that its 
essence springs from the Anglo-American conception of the 'supre-
macy of law' or 'rule of law,' as it is variously called."36 That con-
cept calls for a judicial examination of the administrative determin-
ation to see that it has an evidentiary basis. An administrative 
finding of fact that is not supported by evidence cannot be said 
to have been within the jurisdiction conferred upon the agency. 
Or, to put it another way, "the question whether the administra-
tive finding of fact rests on substantial evidence . . . is really a 
question of law, for a finding not so supported is arbitrary, capri-
cious and obviously unauthorized."37 
Nor should it be assumed that judicial inquiry into the eviden-
tiary basis of administrative fact findings is inconsistent with the 
law-fact distinction upon which, we have seen, the scope of review 
of agency action has been grounded. The question of evidentiary 
support itself is treated by the courts as one of law and hence one 
to be determined by the court upon review. An agency finding 
of fact made without any evidentiary basis is arbitrary and ultra 
vires; the courts can consequently intervene since the primary 
purpose of judicial review in our system is to keep administrative 
agencies within the bounds of the powers delegated to them. 
That this is, in fact, the approach of our courts is shown by Florida 
East Coast Railway Co. v. United States.38 There the Interstate 
Commerce Commission had considered in the same proceeding 
the question of reducing the rates on three railroads running 
through the state of Florida. Although the evidence showed re-
duced costs on only two of the lines, the commission had in-
cluded all three in its rate-reducing order. The Court set aside 
the order in so far as it affected the third line, saying that there 
was no evidence justifying that part of the order, for testimony 
35 LAsKI, A GRAMMAR OF Por.mcs, 4th ed., 393 (1938). 
36 LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 123 (1938). 
37 REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITIEE ON AnlllINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 88 
(1941). 
38234 U.S. 167, 34 S.Ct. 867 (1914). 
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as to the condition of traffic on certain lines did not necessarily 
tend to establish similar conditions on another railroad in regard 
to which no testimony was given. In the course of his opinion, 
Chief Justice White declared, "While a finding of fact made by 
the Commission concerning a matter within the scope of the au-
thority delegated to it is binding, and may not be re-examined in 
the courts, it is undoubted that where it is contended that an 
order whose enforcement is resisted was rendered without any 
evidence whatever to support it, the consideration of such a ques-
tion involves not an issue of fact, but one of law, which it is the 
duty of the courts to examine and decide."39 
Though, as has just been shown, the reviewing court must thus 
reexamine agency fact findings, this does not mean that such find-
ings are to be treated like findings of law. On the contrary, there 
is still an essential difference between the treatment, on review, of 
questions of fact and questions of law. If a question of law is at 
issue, the reviewing court must determine it upon its own inde-
pendent judgment. Where the challenged finding is, on the other 
hand, one of fact, the court cannot substitute its judgment for 
that of the administrator. It is not for the reviewing court to 
determine the correctness of the administrative factual determina-
tion upon its own independent judgment. "The judicial function 
is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the 
conclusions approved by the administrative body."40 The court 
has only to see if the finding is supported by evidence; it is not 
concerned with the weight of the evidence. "In such cases, the 
judicial inquiry into the facts goes no further than to ascertain 
whether there is evidence to support the findings, and the question 
of the weight of the evidence in determining issues of fact lies 
with the legislative agency acting within its statutory authority."41 
It is interesting to note that, although the law of review of 
administrative agencies developed, as we saw, from that governing 
appellate review of inferior courts, there is little doubt but that 
the scope of review of agency findings of fact became narrower 
than that of similar findings by a trial judge. The fact finding of 
an agency came to be treated, for purposes of the scope of review, 
substantially like a special jury verdict and, under the law de-
39 Id. at 185. For a similar English approach, see Bean v. Doncaster Amalgamated 
Collieries, Ltd., [1944] 2 All ,E.R. 279 at 284. 
40 Mississippi Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282 at 286-287, 54 S.Ct. 692 
(1934). 
41 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 at 51, 56 S.Ct. 720 (1936). 
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veloped by the federal courts, "evidence sufficient to support a 
jury verdict or an administrative finding may not suffice to support 
a trial judge's finding."42 Justice Reed said, in a significant case, 
"Since judicial review of findings of trial courts does not have 
the statutory or constitutional limitations on judicial review of 
findings by administrative agencies or by a jury, this Court may 
reverse findings of fact by a trial court where 'clearly errone-
ous.' "43 Where an administrative agency is involved, however, 
· its findings of fact must be upheld if they are supported by sub-
stantial evidence. 
How does the substantial-evidence rule, which dominates the 
scope of review of administrative findings of fact compare with 
the "clearly erroneous" test which applies to appellate review of 
the findings of a trial judge? "A finding is 'clearly erroneous,'" 
said Justice Reed, in the case already referred to, "when although 
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been committed.''44 Prior to the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act of 1946,45 review governed by the test of substantial 
evidence was clearly narrower than this. Indeed, under a preva-
lent pre-AP A interpretation of the substantial-evidence rule, "if 
what is called 'substantial evidence' is found anywhere in the 
record to support conclusions of fact, the courts are said to be 
obliged to sustain the decision without reference to how heavily 
the countervailing evidence may preponderate-unless indeed the 
stage of arbitrary decision is reached. Under this interpretation, 
the courts need to read only one side of the case and, if they find 
any evidence there, the administrative action is to be sustained 
and the record to the contrary is to be ignored.''46 Under this 
interpretation, substantial evidence meant, in effect, such evidence 
as, standing alone, would be sufficient to support a finding. As 
Justice Frankfurter expressed it, with regard to review of the 
42 Orvis v. Higgins, (2d Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 537 at 540. This leads Judge Frank to 
declare: "A wag might say that a verdict is entitled to high respect because the jurors are 
inexperienced in finding facts, an administrative finding is given high respect because the 
administrative officers are specialists (guided by experts) in finding a particular class of 
facts, but, paradoxically, a trial judge's finding has far less respect because he is blessed 
neither with jurors' inexperience nor administrative officers' expertness." Ibid. 
43 United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 at 395, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1948). 
44lbid. 
45 60 Stat. L. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1001. 
46 REPORT OF THE ArroRNEY GENERAL'S COMMITI'EE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 210-
211 (1941). 
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National Labor Relations Board, "It is fair to say that by imper-
ceptible steps regard for the fact-finding function of the Board led 
to the assumption that the requirements of the Wagner Act were 
met when the reviewing court could find in the record evidence 
which, when viewed in isolation, substantiated the Board's find-
ings."47 
It was dissatisfaction with this restricted interpretation of the 
substantial-evidence rule, as much as anything else, that led to the 
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act. By inserting 
an express direction in section 10 ( e) of that act to reviewing 
courts to consider the "whole record" in determining whether 
administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence, the 
draftsmen of the 1946 act sought to do away with the pre-AP A 
judicial tendency just discussed. And in the now-celebrated case 
of Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,48 
the Supreme Court held that the sponsors of the AP A meant 
· just what they said in the "whole record" requirement at the end 
of section 10 (e). "Whether or not it was ever permissible," reads 
the Court's opinion on this point, "for courts to determine the 
substantiality of evidence supporting a Labor Board decision 
merely on the basis of evidence which in and of itself justified it, 
without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence 
from which conflicting inferences could be drawn, the new legis-
lation definitively precludes such a theory of review and bars its 
practice. The substantiality of evidence must take into account 
whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. This is 
clearly the significance of the requirement ... that courts consider 
the whole record."49 
What, then, does the substantial-evidence rule mean today 
under the Administrative Procedure Act? According to one com-
mentator, "underlying the vexed word 'substantial' is the notion 
or sense of fairness .... The concept of fairness relates to the atti-
tude of judging. I would say, then, that the judge may-indeed 
must-reverse if as he conscientiously sees it the finding is not 
fairly supported by the record; or to phrase it more sharply, the 
judge must reverse if he cannot conscientiously escape the con-
clusion that the finding is unfair."50 
47 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 at 478, 71 S.Ct. 456 (1951). 
48 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456 (1951). 
49 Id. at 487-488. . 
50 Jaffe, "Judicial Review: 'Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,'" 64 HARv. 
L. REv. 1233 at 1239 (1951). 
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When, under this view, is an agency finding unfair? It would 
seem, to the present writer, that that is the case when the finding 
is not a reasonable one in the light of the evidence in the whole 
record. Substantial evidence is hence such evidence as might lead 
a reasonable man to make the finding at issue. The evidence in 
support of a fact finding is substantial when from it an inference 
of the existence of the fact may be drawn reasonably.151 In such 
a case, the reviewing court must uphold the finding, even if it 
would have drawn a contrary inference from the evidence. "Choice 
lies with the Board and its finding is supported by the evidence 
and is conclusive where others might reasonably make the same 
choice."152 
The substantial-evidence rule under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act tests the rationality of administrative findings of fact, 
taking into account all the evidence on both sides. The AP A 
brings us back to the meaning of substantial evidence declared by 
Chief Justice Hughes in the Consolidated Edison case-i.e., "such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion."153 The substantial evidence test is thus 
a test of the reasonableness, not of the rightness, of agency findings 
of fact. 
Law or fact? With this preliminary excursus into the scope of 
review completed, we can return to our primary concern, namely, 
the doctrine of Gray v. Powell. The analysis of that case showed 
us that, under its doctrine, review of the agency finding that peti-
tioners were not "producers," within the meaning of that term 
in the relevant statute, was limited to the question of whether 
such finding was reasonable. But, we have just seen, the question 
of reasonableness is also that which the court must now ask itself 
in reviewing administrative findings of fact. Gray v. Powell is so 
important to our administrative law precisely because it makes the 
scope of review of agency findings like that involved in it similar 
to that available over agency findings of fact. In both cases, the 
reviewing court can determine only whether the challenged find-
ings possess a rational basis. 
151 Matter of Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256 at 273, 26 N.E. (2d) 247 
(1940). 
152 Id. at 274. 
ISS Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206 (1938). See 
Benjamin, "Judicial Review of Administrative Adjudication: Some Recent Decisions of the 
New York Court of Appeals,'' 48 CoL. L. R.Ev. 1 at 2 (1948). 
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Gray v. Powell, it hasjust been said, applies to review of the 
finding at issue there the test applicable to review of agency find-
ings of fact. Is the finding that petitioners are not "producers," 
however, one of fact-or even, for that matter, one that is more 
factual than legal in nature? The finding involved in Gray v. 
Powell was one applying the statutory term "producer" to the 
facts of the particular case. Such a finding, involving really the 
application of law to fact, has been treated by the Supreme Court 
both as one of law and as one of fact. The first approach is illus-
trated by the well-known case of Federal Trade Commission v. 
Gratz.54 It was the first case on the power of the newly created 
Federal Trade Commission to restrain "unfair methods of compe-
tition" in interstate commerce. The Court there reversed the 
conclusion of, the commission that the trade practices involved in 
the case constituted such "unfair" methods. The Court did not 
confine itself to the question whether reasonable grounds existed 
for the administrative conclusion. Instead, it determined upon 
its mvn independent judgment the applicability of the statutory 
concept. "The words 'unfair methods of competition' are not 
defined by the statute, and their exact meaning is in dispute. It 
is for the courts, not the Commission, ultimately to determine as 
matter of law what they include."55 
O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon,56 on the other hand, treats the 
type of finding under discussion as one of fact. The agency there 
had found as a "fact" that a death for which compensation was 
sought had arisen "out of and in the course of employment." 
The Supreme Court seemed to agree that the question whether 
the death so arose was to be treated as a question of fact. "Doing 
so" said Justice Frankfurter, "only serves to illustrate once more 
the variety of ascertainments covered by the blanket term 'fact.' "57 
Since only a question of fact was involved, the Court held that 
review was to be governed by the substantial-evidence rule, as it 
was explained in the Universal Camera case.58 
Most commentators have followed Justice Jackson and labeled 
findings of the type under discussion as "mixed findings of law 
and fact.''59 Nor can the Court's labeling of such a finding as 
54 253 U.S. 421, 40 S.Ct. 572 (1920). 
55 Id. at 427. 
56 340 U.S. 504, 71 S.Ct. 470 (1951). 
57 Id. at 507. 
58 Supra note 48. 
59 Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 at 501, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943). 
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only one of "fact" in the Brown-Pacific-Maxon case obscure the 
fact that it actually possesses both legal and factual elements. J us-
tice Frankfurter himself seems to recognize this when he concedes 
that the agency conclusion at issue " ... does not connote a simple, 
external, physical event as to which there is conflicting testimony. 
The conclusion concerns a combination of happenings and the 
inferences drawn from them. In part at least, the inferences pre-
suppose applicable standards for assessing the simple, external 
facts."60 In actuality, the designation by the Court of the finding 
as one of "fact" is simply a means of ensuring that its review will 
be governed only by the narrow scope of review associated with the 
substantial-evidence rule. What was involved in Brown-Pacific-
Maxon was a judicial attempt, of the kind against which an 
English judge once protested, "to secure for a finding on a mixed 
question of law and fact the unassailability which belongs only to 
a finding on questions of pure fact. This is sought to be effected 
by styling the finding on a mixed question of law and fact a finding 
of fact."61 It was the convenient styling of the finding at issue as 
one of fact by the majority of the Court in Brown-Pacific-Maxon 
that led Justice Minton, dissenting there, to declare, "I suppose 
the way to avoid what we said today in Universal Camera Corp. v. 
Labor Board ... is to find facts where there are no facts, on the 
whole record or any piece of it."62 
Although the administrative finding in this type of case may 
well be, in large part, one of fact-i.e., whether the death did arise 
out of and in the course of decedent's employment depends upon 
the factual circumstances under which the death occurred-it also 
involves a question of statutory interpretation. To apply the 
statutory term "out of and in the course of employment" to the 
facts of specific cases is to give concrete meaning to that term. 
It is recognized that it will be denied that a finding of the type 
under discussion is one of statutory interpretation in the strict 
sense. It has been urged that the interpretation and application 
of statutes are two different things. In this view, interpretation 
properly so called includes only the determination of the proper 
sensible meaning of the statute. Application is the process of 
determining whether the facts of the particular case are within or 
60 340 U.S. at 507, 71 S.Ct. 470 (1951). 
61 Great Western Ry. Co. v. Bater, [1922] 2 A.C. l at 12. 
G2 340 U.S. at 510, 71 S.Ct. 470 (1951). 
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without that meaning.63 Under this view, it will be said, findings 
of the type we are concerned with involve only the application, 
not the interpretation, of the relevant statute. 
In the opinion of the present writer, so to differentiate inter-
pretation from application is to make a mere dialectic distinction. 
A statutory term can have meaning only in its application to the 
particular facts of a particular case. 64 Justice Frankfurter has aptly 
pointed out, "Meaning derives vitality from application. Meaning 
is easily thwarted or distorted by misapplication."65 Actually, the 
steps in the process of interpreting statutes may be divided into 
three parts: (I) finding or choosing the proper statute or statutes 
applicable; (2) interpreting the statute law in its technical sense; 
and (3) applying the meaning so found to the case at hand.66 
To find out the meaning of a statutory term only in the ab-
stract is to engage in vacuous academic exercise. It is when the 
meaning so found is applied to the case at hand that the statute 
is really being interpreted. Indeed, as one authority well puts it, 
the final application to a specific case is the crux of the whole 
process of statutory interpretation. 67 
That application really is the critical stage of the interpretive 
process is clear upon consideration of Austin's famous distinction 
between what he called "genuine" and "spurious" interpretation. 
The latter type, said he, involves the application of a statutory 
provision to a case which does not upon a proper interpretation 
come within the statute. "The judge applies the law to the fact, 
according to his opinion of the meaning; or (by a process, which 
is generally confounded with interpretation or construction, but 
which in truth is legislation) he decides according to his own 
notion of what the legislator ought to have established. By this 
extensive or restrictive interpretation ex ratione legis~ much judi-
ciary law grows up. " 68 
What Austin was declaiming against here was judicial misap-
plication of statutory terms. Can it be doubted that, in cases of 
the kind referred to by him, application of law to fact was not 
63 De Sloovere, "Steps in the Process of Interpreting Statutes," IO N.Y. UNIV. L. Q. 
REv. 1 at 17 (1932). 
64 NLRB v. American Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 at 410, 72 S.Ct. 824 (1952). 
65 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 380, 72 S.Ct. 433 (1945). 
66 De Sloovere, "Steps in the Process of Interpreting Statutes," IO N.Y. UNIV. L. Q. R.Ev. 
1 (1932). 
61Id. at 20. 
68 Id. at 19, quoting 2 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 656, 4th ed. (1873). See Pound, "Spurious 
Interpretation," 7 CoL. L. REv. 379 (1907). 
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only part of interpretation of the statute, but, in many ways, its 
most significant part? 
I£ an administrative agency finds that an individual is an em-
ployee of some other individual so as to make the regulatory law 
administered by it applicable to him, the agency appears clearly to 
be interpreting the statutory term "employee." Calling the agen-
cy's act mere application and not interpretation cannot change 
the fact that its action is giving specific meaning to the legislative 
language. And, if questions of statutory interpretation are to be 
determined by the reviewing court upon its own independent 
judgment, it is difficult to see how they can logically limit their 
review over findings claimed to misapply statutory terms. "If 
the appellate courts must make an independent examination of 
the meaning of every word in . . . legislation, on the assumption 
that the construction of legislative language is necessarily for the 
appellate courts, how can they reasonably refuse to consider claims 
that the words have been misapplied in the circumstances of a 
particular case?"69 It was this approach that led Justice Roberts 
to dissent from the decision of the Court in a case applying the 
doctrine of Gray v. Powell to review of an agency finding of the 
existence of an employment relationship. "The question who is 
an employee," said he, "so as to make the statute applicable to 
him, is a question of the meaning of the Act and, therefore, is a 
judicial and not an administrative question."70 
That the doctrine of Gray v. Powell is one which, in reality, 
applies to review of agency interpretations of their enabling legis-
lation has been admitted (in less guarded moments perhaps) by 
members of the highest Court themselves. Under Gray v. Powell, 
stated Justice Black recently, "when administrators have inter-
preted broad statutory terms, such as here involved, we would 
recognize that it is our duty to accept this interpretation even 
though it was not 'the only reasonable one' or the one 'we would 
have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in ju-
dicial proceedings.' "71 
Gray v. Powell assimilates review of questions of statutory in-
terpretation to review of questions of fact. That is a plain state-
ment of its effect, no matter how courts or commentators may try 
69 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 380, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945), per 
Frankfurter, J. 
70 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 at 136, 64 S.Ct. 851 (1944). 
71 Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 at 484, 72 S.Ct. 433 (1952) (dissenting opinion). 
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to obscure its meaning. And it is because of its effect that Gray 
v. Powell is of such great consequence. It blurs the distinction 
between law and fact upon which the scope of review in our ad-
ministrative law had been grounded. It drastically limits review, 
not only of agency findings of "fact" in the narrow, literal sense, 72 
but also of agency constructions of statute-law. The latter are 
matters which, under the traditional theory of Anglo-American 
judicial review, are matters more legal than factual in nature and 
hence for the courts upon review. By conveniently labeling them 
matters of application, rather than interpretation, our courts have 
continued to pay lip-service to the form of the traditional theory. 
But the doctrine of Gray v. Powell tends to make the practical 
effectiveness of that theory a thing of the past in our administrative 
law. 
Cases Following Gray v. Powell 
The practical effects of the doctrine of Gray v. Powell can best 
be seen from an analysis of the Supreme Court decisions following 
it. Such analysis will be limited to the post-Gray v. Powell cases 
in the highest Court, even though it is recognized that Gray v. 
Powell itself was not the first decision applying the doctrine usu-
ally associated with its name. Actually, as Professor Davis points 
out, although Gray v. Powell is now regarded as the leading case, 
"it did no more than to apply what had already been unequivo-
cally established by the Rochester case two years earlier and what 
in another form had been developed as early as the second decade 
of the century."73 In the Rochester case74 referred to (whose 
chief claim to fame in administrative law rests upon the fact that 
in it the Court discarded the so-called "negative order" doctrine 
as a restriction upon the availability of review), Justice Frank-
furter had actually come close to enunciating the doctrine articu-
lated in Gray v. Powell,75 and the same was true, though to a lesser 
extent, of the Court's decision in Shields v. Utah Idaho Central 
72 SEC v. Central-Illinois Corp., 338 U.S. 96 at 126, 69 S.Ct. 1377 (1949). 
73 DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 882 (1951). 
74 Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 59 S.Ct. 754 (1939). 
75 In upholding an agency finding that the Rochester company was "controlled by" 
another telephone company, within the meaning of the relevant statute, Justice Frankfurter 
said, "So long as there is warrant in the record for the judgment of the expert body it 
must stand .... 'The judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational 
basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body.'" Id. at 145 and 146. 
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R. Co.76 Yet, even if this is conceded, for our purposes, it is not 
necessary to deal with the pre-Gray v. Powell decisions. Gray v. 
Powell contains the fullest and, perhaps the best, discussion77 of 
the doctrine now connected with its name and can, for that reason, 
conveniently be considered as the landmark case. 
In analyzing the post-Gray v. Powell cases, one is struck by the 
fact that most of the decisions of the highest Court do follow the 
doctrine of Gray v. Powell when it is relevant. And this impres-
sion is strengthened by the fact that most of the apparent aber-
rational refusals to apply the doctrine, as we shall see in our later 
discussion of them, can be explained on rational grounds as not 
inconsistent with Gray v. Powell. The fact that it is generally 
followed is, indeed, what gives the doctrine of Gray v. Powell its 
significance. As a practical matter, it does limit the scope of review 
in most cases. 
Among the cases applying the Gray v. Powell doctrine, few 
have been more important than National Labor Relations Board 
v. Hearst Publications.78 That case involved an order by the 
NLRB directing respondent to bargain collectively with the news-
boys who sold its papers in Los Angeles. Respondent claimed 
that the newsboys were not its "employees," but were instead in-
dependent contractors. Hence, it was said, the National Labor 
Relations Act was inapplicable. The court of appeals agreed 
with this view and set aside the Board's order as beyond its statu-
tory authority.79 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
lower court had erred in considering independently the correct-
ness of the agency :finding that the newsboys were employees. 
Instead, said the Court, the doctrine of Gray v. Powell should be 
applied. It is true that Justice Rutledge started by paying his 
formal respects to the rule that, on review, questions of statutory 
interpretation are for the courts. "Undoubtedly questions of 
statutory interpretation, especially when arising in the first instance 
in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving ap-
propriate weight to the judgment of those whose special duty is 
76 305 U.S. 177, 59 S.Ct. 160 (1938), where the Court applied the rule of limited review 
to a finding that a carrier was an "interurban" electric railway within the meaning of the 
governing statute. 
77 Stem, "Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges, and Juries: A Comparative 
Analysis," 58 HARV. L. REV. 70 at 103 (1944). 
78 322 U.S. 111, 64 S.Ct. 851 (1944). 
79 Hearst Publications, Inc. v. NLRB, (9th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 608. 
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to administer the questioned statute."80 By going on to apply 
Gray v. Powell, however, he made this statement devoid of most 
of its practical content. "But where the question is one of specific 
application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the 
agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the 
reviewing court's function is limited .... The Board's determina-
tion that specified persons are 'employees' under this Act is to be 
accepted if it has ~warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis 
in law."81 
It has already been emphasized that it is unreal, at least in this 
type of case, to dichotomize interpretation and application. The 
agency's application of the abstract meaning of the statutory term 
to the facts of the particular case was, in truth, the crucial point 
in the interpretive process. And yet, with regard to it, following 
Gray v. Powell, the Court held that review was to be governed by 
the test of reasonableness. It would seem, in fact, that Justice 
Rutledge himself recognized that the finding at issue was com-
posed of both legal and factual elements, for he stated the question 
for the reviewing court to be whether the finding has warrant in 
the record and a reasonable basis in law. "Warrant in the record" 
appears to be but another way of stating the substantial-evidence 
rule. By his use of the term, the learned justice apparently meant 
that the facts found by the agency upon which its ultimate deter-
mination of the existence of an employment relationship was 
based had to be supported by substantial evidence, for the deter-
mination to be upheld. And, in addition, the determination itself 
had to have "a reasonable basis in law." This latter requirement 
was necessary because the application of the statutory term "em-
ployees" to the facts found involved the construction of the rele-
vant act. 
This division by Justice Rutledge of the finding at issue in the 
Hearst case into its factual and legal elements is one with which, 
it is believed, few administrative lawyers would disagree. And 
the same is true of his holding that review of the factual elements 
is to be governed by what is, more or less, the substantial-evidence 
rule. More difficulty is caused, however, by his application of the 
test of reasonableness to what is really a question of statutory con-
struction. It is enough, it might be said, if deference to the agency 
80 322 U.S. 111 at 130-131, 64 S.Ct. 851 (1944). 
81 Id. at 131. For a decision following the Hearst case, see NLRB v. Atkins &: Co., 331 
U.S. 398, 67 S.Ct. 1265 (1947). 
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is paid on the facts found by it which underlie its ultimate finding. 
But, as far as the question of interpretation involved in such 
finding is concerned, the reviewing court should determine 
whether it is right, not merely reasonable, as a matter 1of law. Yet 
this is exactly what the doctrine of Gray v. Powell, as it was ap-
plied in the Hear st case, does not permit the court to do. 
Separation of the type just discussed of administrative findings 
such as those we are concerned with into their legal and factual 
elements (with the former for the courts and only the latter for 
the agencies) was expressly denied to be the basis of the law of 
review in Dobson v. Commissioner,82 where the application of the 
Gray v. Powell doctrine probably achieved its greatest notoriety.83 
The Dobson case dealt with review of a decision of the Tax Court 
holding that the recovery by a taxpayer-in respect of a loss ( on 
a sale of stock) deducted and allowed on returns for an earlier 
year, adjustment of the tax liability for which was barred by limi-
tations-was not taxable income where it found that, viewing as 
a whole the transactions out of which the recovery arose, the tax-
payer had realized no economic gain and had derived no tax bene-
fit from the loss deduction. The court of appeals reversed, stating 
that as matter of law the recoveries were neither return of capital 
nor capital gain, but were ordinary income in the year received.8·1 
The Supreme Court, in deciding that the decision of the Tax 
Court should be upheld, declared that review of its findings should 
be governed by the rules that are applicable in the case of ordinary 
administrative agencies, and particularly by the doctrine of Gray 
v. Powell. As Justice Jackson put it in his opinion, "all that we 
have said of the finality of administrative determination in other 
fields is applicable to determinations of the Tax Court. Its de-
cision, of course, must have 'warrant in the record' and a reason-
able basis in the law. But 'the judicial function is exhausted when 
there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved 
by the administrative body.' "85 
In a significant and oft-cited portion of his opinion, Justice 
Jackson went on to reject the notion that the reviewing court can, 
in this type of case, restrict the rule of limited review to the facts 
82 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943). 
83 Nathanson, "Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes," 3 VAND. 
L. REv. 470 at 471 (1950). 
84 Harwick v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 732. 
85 320 U.S. 489 at 501, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943). 
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upon which the agency determination is based, reviewing the de-
termination itself broadly as involving a construction of the rele-
vant statute. On the contrary, said Justice Jackson, review of the 
entire finding must. be governed by the rule of limited review-
"when the court cannot separate the elements of a decision so as 
to identify a clear-cut mistake of law, the decision of the Tax 
Court must stand."86 
What was meant by this statement is explained by Justice 
Frankfurter in a later opinion. According to him, "Congress did 
not authorize review of all legal questions upon which the Tax 
Court passed. It merely allowed modification or reversal if the 
decision of the Tax Court is 'not in accordance with law.' But 
if a statute upon which the Tax Court unmistakably has to pass 
allows the Tax Court's application of the law to the situation be-
fore it as a reasonable one-if the situation could, without violence 
to language, be brought within the terms under which the Tax 
Court placed it or be kept out of the terms from which that Court 
kept it-the Tax Court cannot in reason be said to have acted 'not 
in accordance with law.' In short, there was no 'clear-cut mistake 
of law' but a fair administration of it.''87 
If this is what the Dobson decision stands for, it would seem 
that what Justice Jackson meant by the "clear-cut mistake of law" 
which could lead to reversal of the Tax Court was simply a finding 
that did not have a reasonable basis in law-which is, of course, 
merely to restate the doctrine of Gray v. Powell. Once it is ad-
mitted that the application of the statuory term or concept by the 
Tax Court was an allowable-i.e., reasonable-one, the function of 
the reviewing court is exhausted. 88 
Dobson v. Commissioner, like the other cases we have been 
discussing, illustrates the fact that the doctrine of Gray v. Powell 
applies to limit review of findings which involve determination 
of questions of law. The Tax Court finding that the particular 
transaction did not constitute taxable income clearly was based 
upon that tribunal's answer to the legal question of what consti-
tuted taxable "income" within the relevant provision of the reve-
nue law. Justice Jackson, it should be noted, expressly denied 
this, asserting that "The error of the court below consisted of 
treating as a rule of law what we think is only a question of proper 
86 Id. at 502. 
87 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 381-382, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945). 
88 Id. at 382. 
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tax·accounting."89 The assertion by the Court cannot, however, 
as Professor Jaffe points out, change the nature of the question 
in.volved. "The accountant may treat a stock dividend as income 
or not, but the question whether a particular stock dividend is 
taxable income does not cease to be a question of law merely be-
cause it involves an 'accounting concept.' "90 The whole point 
about the Dobson case is that it makes no difference whether 
Justice Jackson or Professor Jaffe is right on the question of proper 
classification. "If a question becomes a reviewable question in 
tax cases because, abstractly considered, it may be cast into a 'pure 
question of law,' it would require no great dialectical skill to throw 
most questions which are appealed from the Tax Court into ques-
tions of law independently reviewable by the Circuit Court of 
Appeals.''91 Gray v. Powell, as applied in Dobson, bars the re-
viewing court from considering anything more than the reason-
ableness of the finding-regardless of whether or not the finding 
is really one which answers a question of law. 
The doctrine of Gray v. Powell, in the words of one commen-
tator, led an uneasy existence in tax administration to which the 
Dobson case had applied it, until it was finally banished from the 
field by congressional action.92 But this has had no effect upon 
the doctrine in other branches of administrative law, where it has 
continued to be applied in the majority of cases where it is rele-
vant. Among such cases, perhaps the most numerous have been 
those involving review of the Interstate Commerce Commission-
where, it should be noted, the doctrine of limited review of find-
ings of the type we are concerned with actually had its pre-Gray v. 
Powell origin.93 Many of the ICC cases have concerned the action 
of the commission in granting or denying a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity as a common carrier by motor vehicle 
under the so-called "grandfather clause" of the Motor Carrier Act 
89 320 U.S. 489 at 506-507, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943). 
90 Jaffe, "Judicial Review: 'Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,'" 64 HAR.v. 
L. REv. 1233 at 1259 (1951). 
1ll Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 382, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945). 
92 Nathanson, "Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes," 3 VAND. 
L. REv. 470 (1950). Section 1141 (a) [now §7482] of the Internal Revenue Code was 
amended in 1948 so that review of the decisions of the Tax Court now proceeds in the 
same manner and to the same extent as review of decisions of the federal district courts 
in civil actions tried without a jury. This changes the rule of the Dobson case, insofar as 
review of the Tax Court is concerned. 
93 See, e.g., the Rochester and Shields cases, cited supra notes 74 and 76, or, for an 
earlier case, Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 351 at 361, 35 S.Ct. 370 (1915). 
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of 1935. It provides for the issuance of a certificate by the com-
mission to a carrier which "was in bona fide operation as a com-
mon carrier by motor vehicle on June I, 1935, over the route.~ . 
for which application is made and has so operated since that time 
... except ... as to interruptions of service over which the appli-
cant had no control,"94 without the need for such carrier to submit 
any proof that public convenience and necessity will be served by 
its operation or for any further proceedings. In effect, this pro-
vision gives those who were in operation as motor carriers at the 
time the act was passed a right to the automatic grant of a license 
to continue their operations. "An applicant for a grandfather 
certificate need not prove public convenience and necessity; he 
is entitled to a certificate, as a matter of right, upon proof of sub-
stantial bona fide operations on and continuously since the statu-
tory date."95 
The Supreme Court has held, in a number of cases, that re-
view of Interstate Commerce Commission decisions under the 
"grandfather clause" is governed by the Gray v. Powell doctrine. 
"The function of determining 'grandfather' rights ... ," Justice 
Jackson has stated, "is not unlike the function dealt with in Gray 
v. Powell ... in which we said that Congress could have legisla-
ted specifically as to individual exemptions but 'found it more 
efficient to delegate that function to those whose experience in 
a particular field gave promise of a better informed, more equit-
able adjustment of the conflicting interests ... .' We held that 
this delegation will be respected and that, unless we can say that 
a set of circumstances deemed by the Commission to bring a par-
ticular applicant within the concept of the statute 'is so unrelated 
to the tasks entrusted by Congress to the Commission as in effect 
to deny a sensible exercise of judgment, it is the Court's duty to 
leave the Commission's judgment undisturbed' ... .''96 And, act-
ing in accordance with this view; the Court has applied the doc-
trine of Gray v. Powell to ICC findings in "grandfather clause" 
cases that an applicant was in "bona fide" operations as a motor 
carrier,97 that such applicant was under the "control" of a certifi-
94 49 Stat. L. 551 (1935), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §306. 
95 Motor Freight Express v. United States, (D.C. Pa. 1954) ll9 F. Supp. 298 at 303. 
96 Dissenting, in United States v. Carolina Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475 at 490, 62 S.Ct. 
722 (1942). It should be noted that, despite the implication to the contrary in the dissent, 
the majority did not refuse to follow the rule of Gray v. Powell, holding only that the 
challenged ICC order was not supported by adequate findings. 
97 United States v. Carolina Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 62 S.Ct. 722 (1942); Alton R. 
Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 15, 62 S.Ct. 432 (1942). 
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cated carrier,98 and that an applicant was not a "contract carrier" 
within the meaning of the statute. 99 
Indicating how far the doctrine of Gray v. Powell goes in 
practice are those decisions upholding ICC "grandfather clause" 
findings that interruptions in service were not such as to be beyond 
applicants' control. The statute, already quoted, provides that, 
for "grandfather" rights to be asserted, the applicant must have 
given continuous service as a motor carrier from June 1, 1935 to 
the time of the application, except for interruptions over which 
the carrier "had no control." In Gregg Cartage Co. v. United 
States,10° the Interstate Commerce Commission had held that an 
interruption of service caused by the carrier's bankruptcy was not 
one over which it had no control within the meaning of the act 
and had consequently denied the application. The commission 
based its refusal to find that the applicant 'had no control' over 
the interruption of service upon the fact that such interruption 
followed upon an adjudication of bankruptcy resulting from the 
unsuccessful conduct of its business affairs, and did not go back 
of the adjudication to find and give detailed consideration to the 
particular causes of the failure. The applicant contended that this 
was error, and for a rule requiring that in every case of this sort 
the commission must trace out the chain of causation and weigh 
the bankrupt's judgment against the pressures of circumstance. 
The Court upheld the commission, declaring that it was warranted 
in holding that the interruption because of bankruptcy was not 
one over which the applicant had no control within the meaning 
of the Motor Carrier Act. "Whether or not this assumption squares 
with philosophical doctrine, or even with reality, is not for our 
determination.''101 
There was a strong dissent by Justice Douglas, who asserted 
that the Interstate Commerce Commission was wrong in constru-
ing the statute as not requiring it to go back of the bankruptcy 
adjudication to determine whether the cause of the failure was 
really within the control of the carrier. The facts of this case, 
98 Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 U.S. 73, 63 S.Ct. 465 (1943), under a statutory 
provision denying "grandfather" rights to carriers so controlled. 
,09 United States v. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50, 62 S.Ct. 445 (1942). 
100 316 U.S. 74, 62 S.Ct. 932 (1942). 
101 Id. at 80. Compare McAllister Line v. United States, 327 U.S. 655, 66 S.Ct. 731 
(1946), where an ICC finding that interruptions of service because of the depression and 
the war were due to circumstances other than those over which the carrier had no control 
was upheld. 
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said he, show clearly the error of the ICC's construction. Those 
facts, as summarized by the dissent, are as follows: During the 
year 1936 the applicant was insured against public liability and 
property damage by the Central Mutual Insurance Co. Hearing 
rumors that Central Mutual was in financial difficulties and was 
not paying claims, applicant dropped its policy in December 1936 
and placed its insurance with another company. On January 11, 
1937, Central Mutual was adjudged a bankrupt and ceased pay-
ment of all claims. In the fall of 1937, applicant was forced to 
pay several substantial damage claims arising from accidents dur-
ing the period when its insurance policy was in effect with Central 
Mutual. These payments seriously impaired its working capital. 
Furthermore, applicant was confronted with approximately 175 
additional claims for personal injury and property damage. These 
were estimated at about $200,000 and arose during the period 
when applicant was insured by Central Mutual. Applicant settled 
some of these claims. It was impossible, however, to satisfy the 
demands of all of these claimants. Receivership followed and on 
its heels came bankruptcy. "There is not the slightest evidence 
in this record of any negligence, dereliction, or mismanagement 
on the part of applicant. It is undisputed that its failure was 
due to the failure of its insurer. And there is no evidence in this 
record that it did not exercise due care in the selection of that 
insurer. "102 
After analyzing the facts in the case, it is difficult not to agree 
with Justice Douglas that the commission was wrong in its con-
struction of the act. But, unless its finding is not only wrong, but 
also unreasonable, it must under Gray v. Powell be upheld. In-
terestingly enough, Justice Douglas, who has usually been a con-
sistent adherent of the Gray v. Powell doctrine,103 implied, in his 
dissent, that that doctrine was being pushed too far in this case. 
"I would have supposed," said he, "that the question of 'control' 
was 'an issue of fact to be determined by the special circumstances 
of each case'. . . . That would mean that 'So long as there is 
warrant in the record for the judgment of the expert body it must 
stand.' . . . But that is quite different from acceding to the sug-
gestion that the non-technical word 'control' may be interpreted 
102 316 U.S. 74 at 86, 62 S.Ct. 932 (1942). 
103 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 at 689, 74 S.Ct. 794 
(1954); NLRB v. Highland Park Co., 341 U.S. 322 at 327, 71 S.Ct. 758 (1951). And the 
same has been true of Black, J., who joined in the dissent. See, e.g., Brannan v. Stark, 342 
U.S. 451 at 484, 72 S.Ct. 433 (1952). 
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in a way which goes against all human experience and which 
does violence to its ordinary and accepted meaning."104 If Justice 
Douglas means by this that the agency finding is not only not right 
but also not reasonable, then his refusal to uphold the commission 
is not inconsistent with Gray v. Powell, for, under it, the reviewing 
court can inquire into reasonableness. If, however, he is implying 
that the doctrine of limited review is out of place here because 
of the nature of the particular finding - i.e., it involves, as he says, 
the interpretation of a "non-technical word" - that is quite an-
other thing. It is to this very type of finding that Gray v. Powell 
does apply. And the doctrine of that case justifies the majority 
of the. Court in upholding the agency as it did here.105 
It is not, it is felt, necessary to analyze in detail the other 
Supreme Court decisions applying the doctrine of Gray v. Powell 
-which range from the celebrated second Chenery case106 to a 
number of less noted decisions.107 Before concluding this portion 
of this paper, something should, however, be said of one aspect 
of the Gray v. Powell doctrine that is usually not referred to by 
courts and commentators. And this is the fact that the Gray v. 
Powell type of finding is by its very nature one upon which the 
statutory jurisdiction of the particular agency may depend. 
In referring to this aspect of the Gray v. Powell doctrine, the 
present ·writer has no intention (in this paper, at any rate) of 
tilting a lance for the doctrine of "jurisdictional fact," as sponsored 
by Crowell v. Benson,108 with all the casuistic difficulties spawned 
by it.109 At the same time, it cannot be denied that, where an 
104 316 U.S. 74 at 85, 88, 62 S.Ct. 932 (1942). 
10:; It also seems hard to justify Justice Douglas' dissent if, as he says, the finding at 
issue is one of "fact," since it clearly seems supported by "substantial evidence" under the 
pre-Administrative Procedure Act interpretation of that term. 
For other cases applying Gray v. Powell to ICC findings, see McLean Trucking Co. v. 
United States, 321 U.S. 67 at 91, 64 S.Ct. 370 (1944); Board of Trade v. United States, 314 
U.S. 534, 62 S.Ct. 366 (1942). 
106 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575 (1947) (finding that reorganiza-
tion plan was not "fair and equitable"). 
107 Such decisions, other than those dealt with in other portions of this article, include 
Howell Chevrolet Co. v. NLRB, 346 U.S. 482, 74 S.Ct. 214 (1953) (finding that petitioner 
was engaged in "commerce"); Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 67 S.Ct. 
801 (1947) (finding that death "arose out of and in the course of employment"); Unem-
ployment Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 67 S.Ct. 245 (1946) 
(finding that there was a "labor dispute in active progress"). And see NLRB v. Denver 
Building Council, 341 U.S. 675 at 692, 71 S.Ct. 943 (1951); Switchmen's Union v. National 
Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 at 321, 64 S.Ct. 95 (1943). 
10s 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285 (1932). 
100 So characterized by Frankfurter, J., concurring, in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 
114 at 142, 66 S.Ct. 423 (1946). 
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agency misapplies the statute upon which its power rests, it may 
well be acting beyond its authority. Proper administration of any 
statutory scheme presupposes proper application of the terms and 
concepts employed in the relevant legislation. Misapplication of 
a key statutory term may well enable the agency to act in excess 
of its jurisdiction.110 If an agency like the National Labor Re-
lations ·Board is vested with authority to prohibit unfair labor 
practices committed by employers against their employees, its 
very power to act is. dependent upon the existence of the employ-
ment relationship. To limit review of the Board's application of 
the statutory term "employee" is, in effect, to limit review on the 
jurisdictional question.111 This is what application of the Gray v. 
Powell doctrine does in a great many cases. 
That this is, in fact, the effect of Gray v. Powell may be seen 
from most of the cases just discussed, as well as from Gray v. Powell 
itself. In Gray v. Powell, if petitioners were actually "producers" 
consuming their own product, they were exempt from the statu-
tory scheme of regulation and the agency concerned had no au-
thority over them. In the Hearst case,112 if the newsboys were 
not "employees," the NLRB had no jurisdiction over their em-
ployer, and was consequently without power to order him to com-
ply with the Labor Act.11 3 And the same is true in other cases 
where Gray v. Powell is applied.114 Indeed, it is difficult not to 
conclude that the statutory jurisdiction of an administrative 
agency is always dependent upon proper application of the terms 
and concepts contained in its enabling legislation. Yet, under the 
Gray v. Powell doctrine, such application by the agency will be 
reviewed no more broadly than the agency's findings of pure fact. 
As Justice Murphy has put it, with regard to review of a Federal 
Power Commission finding that a company was a "public utility" 
and hence subject to its orders under the relevant act, "The Com-
mission . . . has the duty in the first instance of interpreting and 
applying these terms to the factual situation confronting it. A 
110 Compare DICKINSON, Am,nNISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAw 307 (1927). 
111 It is not necessary here to discuss the classification of Brandeis, J., in his famous 
dissent in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 at 85, 52 S.Ct. 285 (1932), and decide whether 
findings of this type are "jurisdictional" or only "quasi-jurisdictional." The plain fact is 
that the agency power to act turns upon such a finding. 
112 Supra note 78. 
11a And this was true as well in NLRB v. Atkins & Co., mn U.S. 398, 67 S.Ct. 1265 
(1947), and Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 67 S.CL 789 (1947). 
114 See, e.g., Howell Chevrolet Co. v. NLRB, 346 U.S. 482, 74 S.Ct. 214 (1953); Cardillo 
v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 67 S.Ct. 801 (1947); Unemployment Compensa-
tion Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 67 S.Ct. 245 (1946). 
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court's function in reviewing this jurisdictional determination is 
necessarily limited to ascertaining whether that determination has 
warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in law, giving due 
weight to the fact that the Commission is an expert body desig-
nated by Congress and specially equipped to grapple with the 
highly technical problems arising in this field."115 
One who is familiar with the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Brandeis in Crowell v. Benson116 - the famous case enunciating 
the rule that there must be full review of jurisdictional findings 
- must agree that there are strong practical arguments in favor 
of applying the doctrine of limited review even to findings upon 
which agency power to act depends. At the same time, it should 
clearly be recognized that the doctrine of Gray v. Powell does have 
the effect of restricting review of administrative statutory jurisdic-
tion. And this is inconsistent with the basic theory of ultra vires 
upon which the law of judicial review has been grounded in the 
Anglo-American world.117 "An agency may not finally decide the 
limits of its statutory power," the Supreme Court has asserted. 
"That is a judicial function."118 Under the doctrine of Gray v. 
Powell, however, judicial review of jurisdiction may lose much 
of its practical content. "Where the question of jurisdiction de-
pends, as it often does, on [the application of statutory terms] 
and where the Federal courts apply their version of the 'substantial 
evidence' rule, which often signifies something falling far short 
of the weight of the evidence, the ultimate benefits of judicial 
review of the question of jurisdiction may be little more than pro 
forma. "119 
The dangers inherent in applying the doctrine of Gray v. 
Powell to jurisdictional findings can be illustrated by Packard 
Motor Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,12° where the Board 
115 Dissenting, in Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324 
U.S. 515 at 537, 65 S.Ct. 749 (1945). It should be pointed out that the majority decision 
in this case was not contrary to Gray v. Powell. The Court held only that the FPC had 
misread applicable court decisions [ as had happened in the first Chenery case, SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 63 S.Ct. 454 (1943)], and that the commission decision was not 
clear as to its basis on the jurisdictional issue. 
116 285 U.S. 22 at 65, 52 S.Ct. 285 (1932). 
117 See DICKINSON, ADl',UNISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAw 307 (1927). In 
England, it should be noted, there is still full review of jurisdictional findings. See GRIFFITH 
AND STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 208-211 (1952). 
118 Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 at 369, 66 S.Ct. 637 (1946). 
119 Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. 298 at 303, 70 A. (2d) 77 (1949). The original report 
reads "questions of fact," instead of the language herein inserted in brackets, but Chief 
Justice Vanderbilt's reasoning applies as well to agency applications of law to fact. 
120 330 U.S. 485, 67 S.Ct. 789 (1947). 
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had decided that the foremen employed by appellant company 
constituted an appropriate bargaining unit and had certified their 
union as the exclusive bargaining representative. The company 
asserted that foremen were not "employees" entitled to the ad-
vantages of the Labor Act, and refused to bargain with the union. 
The challenged finding of the Board is the same as that in-
volved in the Hearst case121 and is, like it, "jurisdictional," in that 
the act under which the Board operates is not applicable in the 
absence of the "employer-employee" relationship. Under the Gray 
v. Powell doctrine, the scope of review here, like that in Hearst, 
should be limited to the question of reasonableness, and this, in 
effect, is the theory of review applied by the majority of the Court. 
"There is clearly substantial evidence in support of the determina-
tion that foremen are an appropriate unit by themselves," said Jus-
tice Jackson, "and there is equal evidence that, while the foremen 
included in this unit have different degrees of responsibility and 
work at different levels of authority, they have such a common re-
lationship to the enterprise and to other levels of workmen that in-
clusion of all such grades of foremen in a single unit is appropriate. 
Hence the order insofar as it depends on facts is beyond our power 
of review. . . . Whatever special questions there are in deter-
mining the appropriate bargaining unit for foremen are for the 
Board, and the history of the issue in the Board shows the diffi-
culty of the problem committed to its discretion. We are not at 
liberty to be governed by those policy considerations in deciding 
the naked question of law whether the Board is now, in this case, 
acting within the terms of the statute."122 
Yet, wholly apart from the question of whether such foremen 
should be encouraged to organize for collective bargaining, it 
would seem that this is the type of case where review limited by 
the Gray v. Powell doctrine may be too narrow. The Board, by 
its finding on the existence of the "employer-employee" relation-
ship, has extended the benefits of a labor statute to a group of 
supervisory employees who are not expressly covered by the act, 
and who have in the past normally been identified with the in-
121 Supra note 78. 
122 330 U.S. 485 at 491, 67 S.Ct. 789 (1947). According to Professor Jaffe, the Court 
in the Packard case considered the application of the statutory term "employee" by the 
agency to be a question of law. Jaffe, "Judicial Review: 'Substantial Evidence on the 
Whole Record,' " 64 HARV. L. REv. 1233 at 1258 (1950). It is hard to see how this view 
that the Court granted full review is justified, in view of Justice Jackson's express state-
ment that the substantial evidence rule governed. See, in accord with the present writer's 
interpretation of Packard, DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 898 (1951). 
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terest of management. "Trade union history shows that foremen 
were the arms and legs of management in executing labor policies. 
In industrial conflicts they were allied with management. Man-
agement indeed commonly acted through them in the unfair 
labor practices which the Act condemns."123 It is perhaps not 
too mud-1 to say that the Board has, in effect, re-written the 
governing statute through its interpretation of the statutory defini-
tion. "For if foremen are 'employees' within the meaning of the 
National Labor Relations Act, so are vice-presidents, managers, 
assistant managers, superintendents, assistant superintendents -
indeed, all who are on the payroll of the company, including the 
president; all who are commonly referred to as the management, 
with the exception of the directors. If a union of vice-presidents 
applied for recognition as a collective bargaining agency, I do 
not see how we could deny it and yet allow the present applica-
tion. "124 
This is not to say, of course, that supervisory employees such 
as those involved in the Packard case should not be permitted to 
bargain collectively. "What I have said does not mean that fore-
men have no right to organize for collective bargaining."125 But 
apart from the merits, one wonders whether the administrative 
determination that the protection of the act should extend to 
such foremen should be vested with the same degree of finality 
as administrative findings of fact. Surely this is the type of case 
where the agency interpretation of the statute should be fully 
reviewed. Instead, under the doctrine of Gray v. Powell, the ex-
tension of the enabling legislation by the administrative body 
acting in pursuance of its general policy is placed in a position 
of finality,126 although the Board has been "vested merely with 
the authority of general words of power."127 
Cases Not Following Gray v. Powell 
"If the doctrine expounded in such cases as Gray v. Powell, 
Hearst, and Chenery were consistently applied, the law would be 
susceptible of simple summary. But the doctrine of these cases 
1s sometimes applied and sometimes not."128 That is the one 
123 330 U.S. 485 at 496 (1947) (dissenting opinion). 
124 Id. at 494. 
125 Id. at 500. 
126 Subject, of course, to the rational-basis test of Gray v. Powell. 
127 Lord Shaw, dissenting, in Rex v. Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260 at 300. 
128 DAVIS, ADMINISl'RATIVE LAW 887 (1951). 
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great difficulty with the doctrine of Gray v. Powell for administra-
tive lawyers in this country. Even if one completely disagrees with 
the doctrine itself, he would still wish it to be applied consistently. 
If the Supreme Court, instead of adhering firmly to the doctrine 
which is, of course, the product of its own handiwork, incon-
gruously refuses to follow it in cases where it seems relevant, it 
makes the task of the legal profession an unduly hard one. This 
is especially true when the Court not only does not overrule the 
doctrine but follows it, as we have seen, in the majority of cases. 
It has already been mentioned that perhaps the primary con-
cern of the present writer, in undertaking the reexamination in 
this paper of Gray v. Powell, has been to attempt to explain the 
Supreme Court decisions that have not applied its doctrine. It 
cannot be denied that there has been an all too distressingly large 
number of such decisions. Are they mere judicial aberrations, 
attributable only to the vagaries of the justices of the highest 
tribunal, or can they be explained upon a rational basis? 
It is difficult to answer this question because the Supreme 
Court itself has never seen fit to tell us the circumstances under 
which it would refuse to follow the doctrine of Gray v. Powell. 
In many of these cases, indeed, when the doctrine was seemingly 
not adhered to, the Court did not attempt to tell us at all why it 
was discarding the rule of limited review or, for that matter, even 
to mention Gray v. Powell or the doctrine in its opinion. The fact 
that the Court has not explained why it was acting as it did in 
these cases has not, however, prevented students of its jurispru-
dence from trying to determine the factors upon which the appli-
cation or non-application of the Gray v. Powell doctrine in specific 
cases might depend. 
Perhaps the best-known attempt of this type was that made 
by John Dickinson. According to him, "Where the only ground 
which a court can give for its difference from the administrative 
body is limited to mere difference of opinion as to some matter 
or matters peculiar to the case, or some difference in inference 
from those matters, then the court should not- disturb the opinion 
or inference of the fact-finding body unless the latter is plainly 
beyond the bounds of reason; for the difference is one of discretion, 
or 'fact.' On the other hand, where the ground of difference be-
tween court and fact-finding body can be isolated and expressed 
as a general proposition applicable beyond the particular case to 
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all similar cases, the court, if it holds the proposition one of 
sound law, must enforce it by overruling the administrative de-
termination. "129 
Although this passage was actually written some fifteen years 
before Gray v. Powell, it has been referred to with approval by 
both courts and writers since that case was decided. A typical 
example is the statement by Chief Justice Stone in an important 
case involving the application of Dobson v. Commissioner. 
"Ordinarily," said he, "questions of reasonableness and proximity 
are for the trier of fact, here the Tax Court. . . . And even when 
they are hybrid questi<;ms of 'mixed law and fact,' their resolution, 
because of the fact element involved, will usually afford little 
concrete guidance for future cases, and reviewing courts will set 
aside the decisions of the Tax Court only when they announce a 
rule of general applicability, that the facts found fall short of meet-
ing statutory requirements."130 This appears to be but a restate-
ment of the Dickinson test. 
With all respect to the eminent authority just cited, analysis 
of the Dickinson test indicates that it does not actually explain 
when the Court will and when it will not follow the Gray v. 
Powell doctrine.131 Some of the cases already referred to indicate 
this. In the Gregg Cartage Co. case,132 for example, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, in finding as it did, was really laying 
down a general rule that every bankruptcy arose from conditions 
which were within the "control" of the bankrupt within the 
meaning of the "grandfather clause" of the Motor Carrier Act. 
And, in the second Chenery case,133 as Professor Davis points 
out,134 the Securities and Exchange Commission, in finding that 
the reorganization plan was not "fair and equitable" under the 
relevant statutory provision, had clearly announced what the 
Court called "a new principle,'' which would be applied in other 
reorganization cases. Yet, in both of these cases, where the agency 
129 DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 168 (1927). 
130 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 370, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945). For 
approvals by writers of the Dickinson test, see Stem, "Review of Findings of Administrators, 
Judges, and Juries: A Comparative Analysis," 58 HARV. L. REv. 70 at 105 (1944); Paul, 
"Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact," 57 HARV. L. REv. 753 at 
830 (1944); Brown, "Fact and Law in Judicial Review," 56 HARV. L. REv. 899 at 904 (1943). 
131 In all fairness to Dickinson, it must, of course, be conceded that he never intended 
it to furnish such explanation, as his book was written long before the doctrine of limited 
review in the type of case we are concerned with had crystallized in Gray v. Powell. 
132 316 U.S. 74, 62 S.Ct. 932 (1942). 
133 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575 (1947). 
134 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 904 (1951). 
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findings established general propositions, the Court applied the 
Gray v. Powell doctrine. Conversely, in a number of the cases 
to be discussed in this portion of this paper, where the Court 
appeared not to follow Gray v. Powell, the agency finding seemed 
to involve only the application of the statutory term to the unique 
facts of the case, and did not expressly establish any general propo-
sition applicable beyond the particular case.135 
In addition, it must be admitted that the present writer is 
not clear in his own mind just what the Dickinson test means. 
The difficulty arises from the fact that every agency finding in-
volving the application of a statutory term to the facts of a particu-
lar case establishes "a general proposition applicable . . . to all 
similar cases." "A precedent can always be used as an analogy 
for future cases, even when the facts seem to be unique."136 
Taken literally, then, the Dickinson test appears to be based 
upon a distinction which normally does not exist in practice. The 
agency finding may be based only upon the particular facts; even 
so, it may well serve as the basis for decision in other similar 
cases. As Justice Frankfurter expressed it, in a Tax Court case 
when the Dobson rule was still in effect,137 "It is possible to trans-
form every so-called question of fact concerning the propriety of 
expenses incurred by trustees into a generalized inquiry as to what 
the duties of a trustee are and, therefore, whether a particular activ-
ity satisfied the conception of management which trusteeship de-
volves upon a trustee. Such a way of dealing with these prob-
lems inevitably leads to casuistries which are to be avoided by a 
fair distribution of function between the Tax Court and the re-
viewing courts."138 He went on to reject the Dickinson test as 
the basis for applying the Dobson rule. "But even assuming that 
the 'issues are broader than the particular facts presented' by this 
case, the Tax Court's decision is not deprived of finality. Yet an 
assumption to the contrary is at the core of the Government's 
argument. Simply because the correctness of 'certain general 
propositions' is involved does not make the position taken by the 
Tax Court a question of law."139 
135 See, e.g., Thompson v. Lawson, 347 U.S. 334, 74 S.Ct. 555 (1954); Thompson v. 
United States, 343 U.S. 549, 72 S.Ct. 978 (1952); Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co., 342 
U.S. 197, 72 S. Ct. 233 (1952); Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565, 64 S.Ct. 747 (1944); 
Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 64 S.Ct. 474 (1944). 
136 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 904 (1951). 
137 See no.te 92 supra. 
138 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 383, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945). 
139 Ibid. 
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In the case just referred to, Justice Frankfurter was not con-
tent merely to reject the Dickinson test of general propositions 
versus the application of legal concepts to unique facts.140 He 
also informed us what, in his opinion, the true test was. "The 
real question is: What is the nature of the issue upon which the 
Tax Court has pronounced? If the issue presents a difficulty 
which it is peculiarly within the competence of the Tax Court 
to resolve and that court has given a fair answer, every considera-
tion which led to the pronouncement in the Dobson case should 
preclude independent reexamination of the Tax Court's disposi-
tion.''141 
Justice Frankfurter's test appears to be basically similar to 
that urged by Professor Davis. According to Professor Davis, the 
governing criteria are the comparative qualification of agencies 
and courts. "The one element that stands out above all others 
is the comparative qualification of the agency and of the court 
to decide the particular question. Variation in intensiveness of 
review in accordance with comparative qualifications is so natural 
as to be almost inevitable whatever the theoretical formula."142 
At first glance, the test of comparative qualifications seems an 
attractive one. The basic theory of review of administrative ac-
tion in the Anglo-American world has, indeed, as has been men-
tioned,143 been grounded upon that test, for the law-fact distinc-
tion rests upon a division of labor between judge and administra-
tor, with each being given authority to decide the questions 
deemed to be within his competence. But, although the test of 
comparative qualifications may thus be the ultimate basis of our 
law of judicial review, one wonders whether it alone furnishes 
a workable criterion for the application of the Gray v. Powell 
doctrine. 
Using the comparative qualifications test in the cases where 
the Gray v. Powell doctrine is relevant does not, it is felt, satis-
factorily explain many of the decisions. It is true that, in a case 
like Dobson v. Commissioner,144 where the Court said that the 
challenged finding turned upon a question of proper tax account-
ing, it could validly be said that such a question was peculiarly 
140 The test is so phrased in DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 902 (1951). 
141325 U.S. 365 at 384, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945). 
142 DAVIS, ADl',UNISTRATIVE LAW 893 (1951). 
143 P. 10 supra. 
144 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943). 
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within the special competence of the Tax Court.145 The same 
is true in some of the other cases discussed in this paper.146 Many 
of the decisions cannot, however, be explained by the comparative 
qualifications test. Most of the cases, as Professor Davis concedes, 
"involve questions on which the reviewing judges may easily edu-
cate themselves. Judges as well as administrators are competent 
to handle problems about unfair labor practices, unfair trade 
practices, discriminatory activities of public utilities, deception 
in the marketing of securities, unreasonableness of rates, the 
publc interest with respect to broadcasting, application of the tax 
laws~ and the like."147 And, despite the author's conclusions to 
the contrary,148 it would seem, to the present ·writer at least, that 
the test of comparative qualifications is not workable in cases in-
volving these subjects. 
That this is true can be seen from a comparison of some of 
the cases. In the already discussed Gregg Cartage Co. case,149 the 
Court applied the Gray v. Powell doctrine to limit review of a 
finding that an interruption of a motor carrier's service because 
of bankruptcy was not one over which the carrier had no "control." 
Yet it would seem that the question of whether the bankruptcy 
was within the carrier's control (especially since the agency was 
relying on a general rule that every bankruptcy arose from causes 
within the bankrupt's control within the meaning of the Motor 
Carrier Act) is one on which the courts are at least as competent 
as the agency. 
In the Hearst case,150 as we saw, the Court applied Gray v. 
Powell to review of an agency finding that certain newsboys were 
"employees" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations 
Act. On the other hand, in a case to be discussed, the Court 
appears to have reviewed fully an administrative finding that a 
company was an "employer" under the relevant section of the 
Railroad Retirement Act.151 Why was the agency the better quali-
145 The language used by Frankfurter, J., in Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 
U.S. 365 at 380, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945). 
146 This is particularly true of Interstate Commerce Commission findings, such as 
those involved in cases like Thompson v. United States, 343 U.S. 549, 72 S.Ct. 978 (1952); 
United States v. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50, 62 S.Ct. 445 (1942); Alton R. Co. v. 
United States, 315 U.S. 15, 62 S.Ct. 432 (1942). 
147 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 894 (1951). 
148Ibid. . 
149 Supra note 100. 
150 Supra note 78. 
151 Railroad Retirement Board v. Duquesne Warehouse Co., 326 U.S. 446, 66 S.Ct. 238 
(1946). 
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fied to find the existence of the employment relationship in the 
first case and the Court the better qualified in the second? The 
answer is, of course, that the test of comparative qualifications 
does not explain the difference in the Court's approach in the two 
cases.152 
Even if the comparative qualifications idea were to work more 
satisfactorily, it would still have to be rejected. The whole point 
about judicial review is that, through it, the decisions of the ad-
ministrative expert are subjected to the impartial scrutiny of the 
non-expert judge. In the Anglo-American system, the courts are 
presumed to be competent in matters involving statutory con-
struction, regardless of whether the administrator may, in fact, 
be more qualified in the particular case. Only if such matters 
are decided judicially, it is felt, can it be made certain that the 
agencies do not pass the bounds of their statutory powers. 
What has been said above indicates that the tests suggested 
by some commentators are not adequate to explain the cases which 
do not follow the doctrine of Gray v. Powell. Must we then con-
clude that the application of that doctrine in particular cases de-
pends upon the individual caprices of the judges who make up 
the reviewing court? That there is a certain amount of judicial 
discretion involved in the application of the Gray v. Powell doc-
trine cannot be denied. At the same time, there are certain cri-
teria which appear to have influenced the highest Court in deciding 
not to apply the doctrine in specific cases. What these are can best 
be gathered from an analysis of those cases themselves. Such 
analysis will seek to determine why, in each of these cases, the 
Court did not choose to follow the Gray v. Powell doctrine. Most 
of the Court's refusals can, it will be seen, be explained on rational 
grounds, not inconsistent with the doatrine. This is true even 
though the Court itself did not, in many of these cases, expressly 
state the reasons to be urged by the present writer. 
Adversary procedure in contested cases. If the doctrine of Gray 
v. Powell is a sound one, it rests upon the same theory as does 
limited review of administrative findings of fact. The agency, 
which has made such findings, is presumably more expert than 
the reviewing court in the field administered by it, if only be-
152 See also Thompson v. Lawson, 347 U.S. 334, 74 S.Ct. 555 (1954); Thompson v. 
United States, 343 U.S. 549, 72 S.Ct. 978 (1952); Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 
441, 67 S.Ct. 411 (1947); Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565, 64 S.Ct. 747 (1944), where 
the test of comparative qualifications cannot explain why the Court granted full review. 
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cause of its constant preoccupation with cases in that field. In 
addition, there is the need for preserving the integrity of the 
administrative process. It may be extreme to say, as did a Wis-
consin judge, that "If courts are to weigh the evidence before 
commissions . . ., the efficiency of administrative action will be 
greatly impaired. If it must give a trial de novo, the twilight of 
administrative law is at hand, for the proceedings before the ad-
ministrative body will be but a perfunctory skirmish, the principal 
contribution of which will be delay."153 But there are few ad-
ministrative lawyers in this country who would deny that for the 
courts on review to, in effect, repeat the entire decision process 
of the agencies would be to turn their proceedings into mere 
preliminaries to the real contests which would occur in the courts. 
This would frustrate the legislative purpose in vesting powers of 
decisions in agencies, rather than courts, in the first instance. 
Instead of withdrawing from litigation the great bulk of cases 
coming within administrative competence, it would make possible 
a procedure whereby such cases must be fully litigated twice be-
fore they could be finally resolved.154 
Gray v. Powell applies these considerations, which, from almost 
the beginning of our administrative law, were seen to militate 
against wide review of facts, to agency applications of law to fact, 
even though they may involve the construction by the agency of 
its enabling legislation. Both the rule of limited review of fact 
findings and the doctrine of Gray v. Powell are, however, based 
upon the fact that the findings at issue have been fully considered 
by the agency in an actual contested case. They have been arrived 
at after a formal adversary procedure in which all interested 
parties have been able fully to present their side of the case, both 
through evidence and argument and through the right to attack 
their opponent's case, by cross-examination and rebuttal evidence. 
The findings challenged on review, in cases governed both by the 
substantial-evidence rule and Gray v. Powell, have been made 
by the agency concerned after it has considered the case presented 
by both sides, as it has been developed at the hearing, and, indeed 
under the fundamental principle of "exclusiveness of the record," 
only materials in the record of the hearing can be considered by the 
153 General Accident F. &: L. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 223 Wis. 635 at 
646, 271 N.W. 385 (1937). 
154 Compare Brandeis, J., dissenting, in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 at 74, 52 S.Ct. 
285 (1932). 
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agency in its decision process.11rn That the agency has made its 
findings after a formal adversary proceeding, in which all those 
affected could fully present their case, and after full consideration 
of the record, is bound to be of great influence in inducing the 
reviewing court to defer to those findings, even though they may 
involve questions of statutory interpretation. 
The same considerations do not apply where Gray v. Powell 
type findings have not been made in an actual contested case. 
Even though Gray v. Powell may require judicial deference to 
agency interpretations made in decisions rendered inter partes, 
it does not necessarily follow that the same deference must be 
paid to other administrative interpretations. On the contrary, 
interpretations by agencies of statutes enforced by them which are 
not made in adversary proceedings after full hearing should not 
come within the Gray v. Powell doctrine. There is, as Judge 
Learned Hand has pointed out, "indeed a basis for making such 
a distinction because the position of a public officer, charged with 
the enforcement of a law, is different from one who must decide 
a dispute. If there is a fair doubt, his duty is to present the case 
for the side which he represents, and leave decision to the court, 
or the administrative tribunal, upon which lies the responsibility 
of decision. If he surrenders a plausible construction, it will, at 
least it may, be surrendered forever; and yet it may be right. 
Since such rulings need not have the detachment of a judicial, 
or semi-judicial decision, and may properly carry a bias, it would 
seem that they should not be as authoritative. . . . "156 
The Supreme Court itself appears to have made the distinction 
referred to by Judge Hand the basis-for its decision in Fishgold v. 
Sullivan Drydock and Repair Corp.151 That case involved the 
construction of that portion of the Selective Service Act1158 which 
provided that one who has been inducted into military service is 
entitled, upon returning to civilian life, to be reemployed in his 
old position or in "a position of like seniority, status, and pay." A 
former employee who has thus been reemployed "shall not be 
discharged from such position without cause within one year after 
such restoration." Plaintiff, a veteran, was reemployed. When 
1155 See §7 (d) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 60 Stat. L. 237, 5 
u.s.c. (1952) §1001. 
1156 Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock and Repair Corp., (2d Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 785 at 
789-790. 
1157 328 U.S. 275, 66 S.Ct. Il05 (1946). 
158 54 Stat. L. 885, §8 (1940), now 50 U.S.C. App. (1952) §459 (b) (A) (1). 
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subsequent layoffs occurred because of slack work, he was laid off 
for various brief periods of time, while other employees, non-
veterans, were retained. The non-veterans were senior employees; 
that is, their length of service· with the employer was greater than 
plaintiff's even though his time in military service had been 
counted as service in the plant. The collective bargaining agree-
ment then in force provided that "decreases in the working force 
shall be based on length of service" and the employer acted under 
this contract in retaining older employees when plaintiff was laid 
off. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that, under the 
statute, he could not be laid off within a year after his restoration, 
so long as work was available for any employee. He relied on a 
memorandum issued by the Director of Selective Service pursuant 
to his authority to establish a "Personnel Division" to render aid to 
veterans "in the replacement in their former positions." The Direc-
tor's memorandum stated that the act required reinstatement of a 
veteran to "his former position or one of like seniority, status and 
pay even though such reinstatement necessitates the discharge of 
a non-veteran with greater seniority." The Supreme Court, agree-
ing with the decision of Judge Hand already quoted from, rejected 
the administrative interpretation relied upon by plaintiff. "The 
ruling of the Director," said Justice Douglas, "may be resorted 
to for guidance. . . . But his rulings are not made in adversary 
proceedings and are not entitled to the weight which is accorded 
interpretations by administrative agencies entrusted with the re-
sponsibility of making inter part es decisions. "159 
Several of the cases where the Supreme Court has not followed 
the doctrine of Gray v. Powell can be explained by the absence in 
them of an actual contested case before the agency. The most re-
cent of them is Federal Communications Commission v. American 
Broadcasting Co.~ 160 which may, at first glance, appear to involve 
another capricious refusal of the highest Court to apply the Gray 
v. Powell doctrine. At issue was the validity of an FCC order 
adopting certain interpretative rules in relation to radio and 
television "give-away" programs. The Court, in a unanimous 
decision, held that "give-away" programs were not within the 
criminal statute161 prohibiting the broadcasting of any lottery 
159 328 U.S. 275 at 290, 66 S.Ct. 1105 (1946). This does not mean that the reviewing 
court will not give weight to such agency interpretations. See Skidmore v. Swift and Co., 
323 U.S. 134 at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161 (1944). 
160 347 U.S. 284, 74 S.Ct. 593 (1954). 
16118 u.s.c. (1952) §1304. 
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gift enterprise, or similar scheme offering prizes dependent upon 
lot or chance and that the commission rules attempting to prohibit 
such programs by licensing were invalid. The FCC's authority 
to enforce the criminal prohibition, by the exercise of its licensing 
power, is limited by the scope of the statute. Since the programs 
in question are not illegal under the statute, the commission can-
not employ the statute to make them so by agency action. 
At issue in the instant case was the application of the statu-
tory term "lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme" to the un-
disputed facts. Under Gray v. Powell, the administrative ap-
plication must be upheld if it is reasonable. At the same time, 
there is no doubt that the Court in this case was reviewing not 
the reasonableness, but the rightness, of the FCC action. Why 
was not the Gray v. Powell doctrine applied to limit the scope of 
review here? 
The answer is, at least in part, based upon the distinction 
drawn above between agency interpretations made in contested 
cases after full hearing and those made in other ways. The FCC 
application of the statutory term "lottery, gift enterprise, or 
similar scheme" to "give-away" programs was not made in an 
actual case decided by the agency. It was contained, instead, in 
an order of the commission adopting certain interpretative rules 
in relation, to such programs. Like the rules at issue in the cele-
brated Columbia Broadcasting System case,162 whether these rules 
would actually be applied in a specific case depended upon the 
contingency of future administrative action. Nor did it make any 
difference, in the instant case, that the proposed rules had actually 
been considered at a hearing of the full commission. This did not 
change the nature of the proceeding from rule-making to adversary 
adjudication. "It was not necessary for the Commission to take 
testimony before adopting the Rules .... The Commission was not 
adjudicating any controversy which would require a hearing and 
the application of trial procedure. That might come later, in a 
specific case, when an application for a renewal license would be 
under consideration. "163 
The fact that general rule-making was involved in the A meri-
can Broadcasting Co. case would appear to explain why the Court 
there did not limit review by the Gray v. Powell doctrine, for it 
162 316 U.S. 407, 62 S.Ct. 1194 (1942). 
163 American Broadcasting Co. v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 374 
at 383. 
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applies only to agency resolutions of specific contested cases. Yet, 
even though the agency action may dispose of an actual case, the 
considerations which make for the application of Gray v. Powell 
may not be present. That case requires judicial deference to the 
type of finding involved in it because the agency, vested with com-
petence by the legislature in the particular case, has made the 
finding after full consideration of all of tlJ_e evidence presented at 
a formal adversary hearing. If the agency decision, though it 
resolves a contested case, is one which has not been preceded by a 
full hearing, the doctrine of Gray v. Powell need not be applied. 
What has just been said helps to explain a Supreme Court 
decision, which has given difficulty to commentators seeking to 
explain the Gray v. Powell doctrine. In the case referred to -
Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles164-petitioner conducted a public 
warehouse in Los Angeles. As a public utility under the ap-
plicable California laws, it was subject to regulation by the rel-
evant California agency. The Federal Price Administrator, act-
ing under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,165 issued 
maximum price regulations whose effect would have been to 
prohibit petitioner from charging an increased rate authorized 
by the California regulatory agency. The Price Control Act pro-
vided that "nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize 
the regulation of . . . (2) rates charged by any common carrier or 
other public utility." Petitioner, asserting itself to be within 
this exemption, made timely protest to the price administrator, 
which was denied. It then filed a complaint with the Emergency 
Court of Appeals, asking it to set aside the maximum price reg-
ulations in so far as they purported to regulate its charges. The 
Emergency Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint.166 The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that petitioner was a "public 
utility" within the exemption clause of the federal law. 
There is little doubt but that the Court in the Davies case sub-
stituted its judgment for that of the agency in the manner which 
the Gray v. Powell doctrine sought to preclude. Indeed, Justice 
Jackson expressly rejected as inapplicable in the case the doctrine 
that "we should accept the Administrator's view in deference to 
administrative construction."167 It is not, however, necessary to 
164 321 U.S. 144, 64 S.Ct. 474 (1944). 
165 56 Stat. L. 23, c. 26, §302 (c) (1942). 
166 Davies Warehouse Co. v. Brown, (Em. Ct. App. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 201. 
167 321 U.S. 144 at 156, 64 S.Ct. 474 (1944). 
1955] GRAY VS. POWELL AND THE SCOPE OF REVIEW 45 
conclude from this that the Davies case is inconsistent with Gray 
v. Powell.168 Although the two cases were substantially similar169 
there was at least one basic difference. In Gray v. Powell, the 
challenged finding had been made after a formal adversary hear-
ing before the agency. In Davies, this essential element was lack-
ing. The price administrator had, it is true, decided petitioner's 
specific case. But he had not done so after a full and fair hearing. 
Although the protest procedure of the Office of Price Administra-
tion did afford affected individuals some opportunity to present 
their views, it clearly did not provide for a full, judicial-type ad-
versary hearing "in accordance with the cherished judicial tradi-
tion embodying the basic concepts of fair play."170 And, in such 
a case, as already pointed out, there is reason for not vesting the 
agency interpretive finding with the Gray v. Powell degree of 
finality.171 
Conflicting interpretations. The doctrine of Gray v. Powell 
applies the rule of limited review to administrative interpretations 
of statutory terms, provided, as we have just seen, that such inter-
pretations are made in actual contested cases after full hearings. 
In such cases, it is felt by our courts, they must defer to the 
agencies charged with the job of continuous administration in the 
areas assigned to them by the legislature. Gray v. Powell rests 
essentially upon the expertise of administrative agencies, which is 
said to render them peculiarly competent in their specialized fields, 
even when it comes to giving specific content to the terms of legisla-
tion covering those fields. To paraphrase Justice Frankfurter, the 
specialized equipment of the agencies and the trained instinct that 
comes from their experience ought to leave with them the final say 
as to matters which involve construction and application of legisla-
tion.172 
168 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 887-888 (1951), so concludes. 
169 Id. at 887. 
170 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 at 22, 58 S.Ct. 773 (1938). That the procedure 
under the Emergency Price Control Act provided for less than a full adversary hearing is 
well shown by Roberts, J., dissenting, in,Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 at 453-454, 
64 S.Ct. 660 (1944). 
171 Other cases where full review was granted because of the lack of formal adversary 
hearings are Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 67 S.Ct. 1547 (1947); United States v. 
Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 67 S.Ct. 1463 (1947). Compare Frankfurter, J., dissenting, in SEC v. 
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 at 301, 66 S.Ct. IIOO (1946) (rule of limited review not applicable 
where action brought by agency for injunction). 
172 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 380-381, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945). 
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It would seem, however, that for judicial deference to be re-
quired on review of the Gray v. Powell type of finding, the chal-
lenged administrative interpretation should be consistent with 
that rendered in other cases ·by the agency. If, on the contrary, 
the agency construction at issue is inconsistent with that taken on 
other occasions, there is much less reason for the Gray v. Powell 
doctrine to apply. Where the administrative expert himself is 
so unsure of his ground that he has taken different positions in 
different cases, the courts may be forgiven if, on review, they feel 
something less than the confidence in agency expertise that called 
forth the rule of limited review in Gray v. Powell itself. In such 
a case, the reviewing court may well declare that the agency de-
cisions themselves hardly have the consistency to which it should 
yield its judgment.173 This view was well expressed by Justice 
Rutledge in a case where the agency174 had rendered inconsistent 
decisions applying the relevant statutory term in two cases before 
it. "One might," he conceded, "entertain the view that in a close 
situation the [agency's] judgment should be accepted whatever way 
the die were cast, although reviewing courts might differ on the 
direction. But it would not follow, and in my judgment should 
not, that they are powerless when the throw is in opposite direc-
tions at the same time. When this occurs, in my opinion a 'clear-
cut' question of law is presented, rising above the rubric of 'expert 
administrative determination.' The more apt characterization 
would be 'expert administrative fog.' "175 
A number of Supreme Court decisions which appear incon-
sistent with the doctrine of Gray v. Powell can be explained by 
the fact that there were conflicting administrative interpretations 
present in those cases. An illustrative case is Barrett Line v. Uni-
ted States,116 which arose out of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion's refusal to grant an applicatiqn for "grandfather" rights to 
engage in the business of a contract carrier by water, under a 
statutory provision basically similar to that applicable to motor 
carriers which has already been considered.177 Review of ICC 
173 Hand, J., in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock. and Repair Corp., (2d Cir. 1946) 154 F. 
(2d) 785 at 789. 
174 The case involved review of the Tax Court which was, at that time, under the 
rule of Dobson v. Commissioner, supra note 82, treated like an administrative agency so 
far as the scope of review of its decisions was concemed. 
175 John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 at 533, 66 S.Ct. 299 (1946). 
176 326 U.S. 179, 65 S.Ct. 1504 (1945). 
177 Supra note 94. 
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decisions under the "grandfather clause" of the Motor Carrier Act 
is, we have seen, governed by the doctrine of Gray v. Powell. 
Despite this, the Court, in the Barrett Line case, held that the 
commission had erred in concluding that the applicant was not 
engaged in chartering operations subject to the act on the critical 
date. The Court seems to have reviewed the rightness, rather 
than merely the reasonableness, of the commission's decision 
that the applicant was not a bona fide carrier engaged in charter-
ing operations. And this led four dissenting justices, citing Gray 
v. Powell, to assert, "We think that the interpretation ... made 
by the Commission was proper. Certainly, the construction of 
this provision involves considerations so bound up with the tech-
nical subject matter that, even though the neutral language of 
the statute permits, as a matter of English, the construction which 
the Court now makes, the experience of the Commission should 
prevail."178 
The apparent arbitrary refusal of the majority of the Court to 
follow Gray v. Powell is explained by the fact that the ICC itself 
had, in a number of other cases involving similar facts, reached a 
different result, holding in them that the applicants were engaged 
in bona fide operation as carriers within the meaning of the act. 
What the Court terms this agency "inconsistency in the statute's 
application"179 was, without a doubt, the factor that induced the 
Court to decline to follow the Gray v. Powell approach. This is 
recognized by the dissenting justices, who state that, "The Court, 
in rejecting the refusal of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
to grant a permit as a contract carrier by water for charter pur-
poses, is greatly influenced by an alleged conflict in the Commis-
sion's determinations."180 The dissenters go on to declare that 
the inconsistencies in agency interpretation should make no dif-
ference. "Assuming such a conflict, it is our business to deal with 
the case now here and not to be concerned with apparent incon-
sistencies in administrative determinations."181 It has already 
been shown, however, that the presence of conflicting interpreta-
tions is of great importance in determining whether the Gray v. 
Powell doctrine should be followed. Where the administrative 
178 326 U.S. 179 at 202, 65 S.Ct. 1504 (1945). 
179 Id. at 197. 
180 Id. at 201. 
181 Id. at 201-202. 
182 Compare United States v. American Union Transport, 327 U.S. 437 at 454, 66 S.Ct. 
644 (1946) (agency failure to exercise jurisdiction held not like conflicting interpretations 
so as to make Gray v. Powell inapplicable). 
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expert himself is not certain that the interpretation urged by him 
in the particular case is sound, there is no real reason why the re-
viewing court should defer to his judgment.182 
In the Barrett Line case just discussed, the conflicting applica-
tions of the statute were made by the same agency. What happens 
if the inconsistent interpretations are made by different agencies? 
In such a case, too, it is believed the doctrine of Gray v. Powell 
should not apply. If the interpretation of the administrative ex-
pert whose act is being reviewed is contradicted by that of other 
administrators, the reviewing court should decide the question for 
itself, rather than show the Gray v. Powell type of deference to 
any of the conflicting experts. For, if this is not done, to which of 
the experts should the court defer? To the agency whose act is 
being reviewed, simply because it happens to be involved in the 
particular case? If that is the rule, what is the court to do if, at a 
later date, the inconsistent interpretation of the other agency is 
challenged before it? Such interpretation will also have to be up-
held if it is reasonable and that may well mean the giving of 
judicial sanction to two diametrically opposed agency interpreta-
tions. 
That this is not a mere theoretical possibility is shown by 
Barnard v. Carey,183 a case whose facts were so extreme as almost to 
defy belief, except that they were so reported by the district court. 
The plaintiffs in the Barnard case were the manufacturer of and 
·a dealer in "Soya Butter," a product made exclusively from soya 
beans and other vegetable products. Under the relevant section 
of the Internal Revenue Code,184 the Collector of Internal Reve-
nue could order oleomargarine manufactured for sale to be labeled 
and taxed as such. His orders with respect to labeling could be 
enforced by distraint proceedings as well as by criminal penalties. 
At the same time, under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,185 
the Food and Drug Administration was given authority to see that 
food products were labeled properly. And improp.er labeling 
under that law, too, could be punished by distraint and criminal 
penalties. 
In the district court, plaintiffs offered in evidence a photostatic 
copy of a letter dated November 13, 1942, addressed to the plain-
tiff Butler Food Products, attention H. 0. Butler, and signed by 
183 (D.C. Ohio 1945) 60 F. Supp. 539. 
184 I.R.C. §2300 et seq., now I.R.C. (1954), §§4591-4597. 
185 52 Stat. L. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. (1952) §§301-392. 
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D. S. Bliss, Deputy Commissioner, stating that according to the 
analysis of the Treasury Department the product was found to be 
oleomargarine and that it would be necessary therefore for the 
manufacturer to label his product as such. Plaintiffs also offered 
in evidence a photostatic copy of a letter dated October 31, 1942, 
addressed to H. 0. Butler, Director Butler Food Products, and 
signed by C. W. Crawford, Assistant Commissioner of Food and 
Drugs, stating: "It is our understanding that you are familiar with 
the standard for oleomargarine promulgated under the terms of 
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The product you 
describe is not in conformity with that standard and can not be 
sold as oleomargarine within the jurisdiction of that Act." 
The plaintiffs were thus subject to diametrically opposed orders 
by two federal agencies, each of which had jurisdiction under the 
relevant laws. The Bureau of Internal Revenue had ordered them 
to label their product as oleomargarine. The Food and Drug Ad-
ministration had ordered them not to label their product as 
oleomargarine. And, if either order was disobeyed, the plain-
tiffs were subject to the penalties prescribed in the act. In order 
to extricate themselves from their predicament, plaintiffs brought 
an action against the Collector of Internal Revenue for a declara-
tion that their product was not oleomargarine and should not be 
taxed as such. 
For the reviewing court to apply the Gray v. Powell doctrine 
to limit its review of the order challenged before it in a case like 
this, in the face of the conflicting interpretation of the Food and 
Drug Administration, would be, to put it mildly, unjust to plain-
tiffs. Under Gray v. Powell, the Treasury's application of the 
statutory term "oleomargarine" to the facts of the case would have 
to be upheld, unless it was unreasonable. But the same would 
also be true of the ruling of the Food and Drug Administration in 
a later action testing its validity. As the opinion of the court in 
the Barnard case put it, "When the court inquired whether all the 
arguments advanced for the Collector could not also be advanced 
in support of the order of the Commissioner of Foods and Drugs, 
it was admitted that they could be. The court therefore found 
· itself in the position where, if it adopted those theories, it would 
today be obligated to sustain the order of the Collector distraining 
the plaintiff's product because not labeled 'oleomargarine', and 
then tomorrow might be obligated to sustain the order of the Com-
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missioner of Food and Drugs distraining the product because it 
was labeled 'oleomargarine.' "186 
In a case like Barnard v. Carey, the Gray v. Powell doctrine 
would lead to ridiculous results. Under it, the action of both 
agencies would have to be upheld, for each, if it stood alone, in-
volved a reasonable interpretation of the law. But, said Judge 
Wilkin, in granting a motion for a temporary injunction against 
the enforcement of the Treasury order, a court exercising general 
equitable jurisdiction must be able to give plaintiffs some remedy. 
The implication is that where the agencies themselves conflict in 
their interpretations, there is no room for the doctrine of limited 
review. And, while this may be contrary to Gray v. Powell, it is 
certainly in accord with common sense. 
Barnard v. Carey is the extreme case. Yet it shows that the 
rule of limited review is wholly out of place in cases where chal-
lenged administrative applications of statutes are inconsistent with 
those made by other agencies. In such cases, there is no reason 
why the reviewing court should defer to the expertise of any one 
agency. It should consequently decline to follow Gray v. Powell. 
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock and Repair Corp.,181 which has 
been discussed in another connection, appears to bear out this 
view. We have already seen that the Court there refused to follow 
Gray v. Powell because the agency interpretation had not been 
made in a contested adversary proceeding. Also of weight, how-
ever, in inducing the Court to decide as it did was the fact that the 
interpretation of the Director of Selective Service, upon which 
plaintiff had relied, was inconsistent with the construction given 
to the relevant statutory term by the National War Labor Board. 
This inconsistency in the agency interpretations was emphasized 
both by Judge Learned Hand in the lower court188 and in the 
opinion of Justice J ackson.189 
Another case where the inconsistency of administrative inter-
pretations was of influence in leading the Court not to apply the 
doctrine of limited review is Social Security Board v. Nierotko190-
a decision which, almost more than any other, has defied analysis 
186 60 F. Supp. 539 at 540-541. 
187 Supra note 157. 
188 154 F. (2d) 785 at 789. 
189 328 U.S. 275 at 290, 66 S.Ct. 1105 (1946). 
100 327 U.S. 358, 66 S.Ct. 637 (1946). 
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in terms of the Gray v. Powell doctrine. In the Nierotko case, 
respondent was found by the National Labor Relations Board to 
have been wrongfully discharged for union activity by his em-
ployer and was reinstated by that Board in his employment with 
directions for "back pay" for the period of his discharge. The 
"back pay" was paid by the employer. Thereafter respondent 
requested the Social Security Board to credit him in the sum of 
the "back pay" on his Old Age and Survivor's Insurance account 
with the Board. The Board refused to credit the "back pay" as 
wages. The Court set aside the Board's decision, holding that the 
"back pay" was wages within the meaning of the relevant statute. 
In its Nierotko decision, the Court was plainly substituting its 
judgment for that of the Social Security Board. ". . . We think it 
plain," said Justice Reed, "that an individual ... who receives 
'back pay' for a period of time during which he was ·wrongfully 
separated from his job, is entitled to have that award of back pay 
treated as wages .... "191 The administrative decision to the con-
trary, declared the opinion, is "unsound."192 
The seeming inconsistency between the Court's approach in 
Nierotko and Gray v. Powell is, if anything, increased, rather 
than diminished, by Justice Reed's attempt to distinguish the 
Gray v. Powell line of cases. To the argument that National Labor 
Relations Board v. Hearst Publications193 and Gray v. Powell re-
quired the Court to uphold the agency interpretation, Justice 
Reed stated, "Administrative determinations must have a basis 
in law and must be within the granted authority."194 Yet, as 
Professor Davis aptly points out, "The same remark, of course, 
would be equally applicable to both GraY. v. Powell and the Hearst 
case, but the validity of the remark did not prevent the Court in 
those cases from limiting its inquiry to 'rational basis' of the ad-
ministrative interpretation."195 Justice Reed went on to say that 
the Board's interpretation went beyond the statutory limits, declar-
ing in an already-cited passage, "An agency may not finally decide 
the limits of its statutory power. That is a judicial function."196 
But the same could be said of most cases which follow the Gray v. 
Powell doctrine. As has already been emphasized, the agency's 
191 Id. at 364. 
192 Id. at 367. 
193 Supra note 78. 
194 327 U.S. 358 at 369 (1946). 
195 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 909-910 (1951). 
196 327 U.S. 358 at 369, 66 S.Ct. 637 (1946). 
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statutory jurisdiction will normally depend upon its proper ap-
plication of the terms contained in its enabling legislation. And, 
under Gray v. Powell, the agency itself may consequently be vested 
with the authority all but finally to decide the limits of its statu-
tory power. 
Despite the weakness of the Court's attempt to explain its 
Nierotko decision, it should be pointed out that there was present 
in that case a factor which might well lead to the judicial refusal 
to apply the Gray v. Powell doctrine, namely, that of conflicting 
agency interpretations. The Social Security Board, in holding 
that "back pay" was not wages, had relied upon the definition in 
the Social Security Act of wages as "remuneration for employment" 
and employment as "any service . : . performed ... by an employee 
for his employer .... "197 The Board urged that respondent did 
not perform any service for the "back pay" received by him. The 
Court, however, referred to the fact that both the Social Security 
Board itself and other agencies had treated payments made by 
employers, for which no specific services had been performed, as 
wages. Thus, a regulation of the Social Security Board had char-
acterized vacation allowances as wages, and the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue had classified dismissal pay, vacation allowances, and sick 
pay, as well as amounts paid employees during absence on jury 
service, as wages.198 These interpretations, which are inconsistent 
with that made by the Board in the Nierotko case,199 would seem 
to be reason enough for the Court not to limit its review by the 
Gray v. Powell doctrine. Unless the administrative experts them-
selves are consistent in their interpretations, reviewing courts need 
not, even under Gray v. Powell, defer to them.200 
A variation of the problem of conflicting interpretations on 
the part of different agencies has been presented since 1947 in 
cases involving the National Labor Relations Board. Under the 
Taft-Hartley Act of that year,201 the Board was, in effect, split into 
197 49 Stat. L. 625 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. (1952) §§409, 410. 
198 327 U.S. 358 at 366 (1946). 
199 It should also be pointed out that the National Labor Relations Board, in NLRB 
v. Killoren, (8th Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 609, had argued tha "back pay" constituted wages 
in a bankruptcy cas!!. This was of influence in inducing the court of appeals to decide as 
it did in Nierotko. (6th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 273 at 277. 
200 The Court in Nierotko was also aided by the fact that both the Social Security 
Board and the Department of Justice indicated that they were not sure that the Board's 
interpretation was sound, even if the statute compelled it. See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAw 910, n. 178 (1951). 
20161 Stat. L. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §153. 
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two more or less separate agencies, with powers of investigation 
and prosecution being vested in the independent Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel, while the Board itself was left only with powers of 
hearing and decision. Are the General Counsel and the Board 
to be treated today like two separate agencies, if their interpreta-
tions of the statute conflict, for purposes of applying the doctrine of 
Gray v. Powell? The answer to this question should depend upon 
the actual extent of the separation between the Counsel and the 
Board. If they are, in fact, really two distinct agencies-each with 
its separate functions to perform and not subject to each other's 
control-then there would seem to be no real reason why they 
should not be so treated, insofar as the Gray v. Powell doctrine is 
concerned. 
As the Taft-Hartley provisions have worked out, it seems not 
unfair to conclude that there has been, in practical effect, a division 
of the Labor Board into two separate agencies. It is true that, in 
form, the separation has not been as complete as it would have 
been had the Board's investigating and prosecuting functions been 
transferred to the Department of Justice.202 In substance, how-
ever, the General Counsel has been given authority independent 
of the Board, and the post-1947 conflicts between the Board and 
the Counsel show how real the latter's independence has actually 
been. 
Since the NLRB and the General Counsel are, in fact, if not in 
form, separate agencies, there is good reason for treating them as 
such for the purposes of applying Gray v. Powell. Since both the 
Counsel and the Board are now the administrative experts in the 
field of labor relations, their constructions of the relevant statute 
should not conflict, if there is to be the consistency in administra-
tive interpretations required for the doctrine of limited review 
to apply. If, on the contrary, their interpretations are incon-
sistent, the considerations discussed in connection with cases like 
Social Security Board v. Nierotko203 should govern. 
A Supreme Court decision involving a post-Taft-Hartley re-
view of the NLRB which is explainable, if at all, only upon the 
above basis is National Labor Relations Board v. Highland Park 
Manufacturing Co.204 In that case, the Board had entertained a 
complaint by the Textile Workers Union of America against 
202 See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 399 (1951). 
203 Supra note 190. 
204 341 U.S. 322, 71 S.Ct. 758 (1951). 
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respondent and ordered respondent to bargain with that union. 
At all times relevant to the proceedings, the Textile Workers 
Union was affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
and, while the Textile Workers Union officers had filed the non-
Communist affidavits required by the Taft-Hartley Act, the officers 
of the CIO at that time had not. The statute provides that "No 
investigation shall be made by the Board. . . , no petition under 
section 9 (e) (1) of this section shall be entertained, and no com-
plaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organi-
zation under subsection (b) of section 10, unless there is on fiJe 
with the Board an affidavit executed . . . by each officer of such 
labor organization and the officers of any national or international 
labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that 
he is not a member of the Communist Party .... "205 The order 
was challenged upon the ground, among others, that the failure 
of the CIO officers to file non-Communist affidavits disabled its 
affiliate, the Textile Workers Union, and the Board could not en-
tertain their complaint and enter the order. 
The Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the court of 
appeals,206 held that the NLRB could not, in these circumstances, 
entertain the complaint. The Board had based its action upon the 
view that the use of the adjectives "national" and "international" 
in the statutory provision excluded the CIO, because it is re-
garded in labor circles as a federation ratl).er than a national or 
international union. And, said the Board, on review, its finding 
that the CIO did not come within the statutory term "national 
or international labor organization" was subject only to the limited 
review permitted by the doctrine of Gray v. Powell. The Court 
rejected this claim and decided, on its own independent judgment, 
that the CIO came within the statutory term. 
It is clear from the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter207 
that the Board's finding was at least a reasonable one. Why then 
did not the Court uphold the finding under Gray v. Powell? 
Justice Jackson's majority opinion gives two answers. In the first 
place, said he, "here there is no question of fact."208 But it has 
been settled from the beginning that the Gray v. Powell doctrine 
applies to agency applications of statutory terms to undisputed 
205 61 Stat. L. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §159h (emphasis added). 
206 (4th Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 98. 
201 341 U.S. 322 at 327, 71 S.Ct. 758 (1951). 
20s Id. at 325. 
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facts.209 And, even more important, said Justice Jackson, the 
question at issue is one of law upon which the very power of the 
agency depends. "An issue of law of this kind, which goes to the 
heart of the validity of the proceedings on which the order is based, 
is open to inquiry by the courts when they are asked to lend their 
enforcement powers to an administrative tribunal."210 Yet that, 
as we have seen, can also be said of most of the cases where the 
Court followed Gray v. Powell. As Justice Douglas expressed it 
in a separate dissent, "In situations no more difficult than this we 
have taken the administrative construction of statutory words. 
Until today the test has been not whether the construction would 
be our own if we sat as the Board, but whether it has a reasonable 
basis in custom, practice, or legislative history."211 
Despite the fact that the reasons given by Justice Jackson do 
not really distinguish Highland Park from Gray v. Powell, it is the 
opinion of the present writer that the Court was correct in its 
refusal to follow the doctrine of limited review. And that is the 
case because there was, in actuality, a conflict in agency interpreta-
tions present in the Highland Park case. The General Counsel of 
the Board had ruled that the Board could not entertain a com-
plaint under these circumstances; but the Board, with one member 
dissenting, overruled him. As has been pointed out, the NLRB 
and the General Counsel have, since the Taft-Hartley Act, been in 
substance two separate agencies. When they conflict in their inter-
pretations, there is lacking the consistency in administrative ex-
pertise to which the courts should make the Gray v. Powell type 
of deference. And, if that is true, Highland Park can rightly be 
treated like cases such as the already-discussed Fishgold212 and 
Nierotko cases.213 
200 In Gray v. Powell itself, indeed, there was no dispute as to the facts. And see 
Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 at 478, 67 S.Ct. 801 (1947), where the 
Court expressly stated that the basic facts were undisputed in this type of case. 
210 341 U.S. 322 at 326, 71 S.Ct. 758 (1951). 
211 Id. at 327-328. 
212 Supra notes 157 and 187. 
213 Supra note 190. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, supra note 164, presents another 
variation of the problem of conflicting agency interpretations. The holding of the Federal 
Price Administrator there that petitioner was not a "public utility" and hence not exempt 
from the federal price control law was contrary to the view taken by the relevant Cali-
fornia regulatory agency which had consistently treated petitioner as a "public utility." 
The fact that the conflicting interpretation was by a state, rather than a federal, agency 
should make no difference so far as the applicability of Gray v. Powell is concerned, 
provided that the state agency has jurisdiction to make such interpretation. 
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Unreasonable findings. Some of the Supreme Court decisions 
refusing to uphold agency findings of the Gray v. Powell type are 
explainable on the simple ground that the findings upset were not 
only wrong but unreasonable. Such cases are not inconsistent with 
the Gray v. Powell doctrine, for, even under it, the reviewing court 
can reverse where the challenged finding is seen not to have a 
rational basis. 
These cases are easy to deal with where the Court tells us ex-
pressly that the finding upset was unreasonable. Such a case is 
United States v. Pacific Coast Wholesalers.214 It involved a pro-
vision of the Interstate Commerce Act exempting from regulation 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission "the operations of a ship-
per, or a group or association of shippers, in consolidating or dis-
tributing freight for themselves or for the members thereof, on a 
nonprofit basis, for the purpose of securing the benefits of carload, 
truckload, or other volume rates .... "215 In the instant case, the 
ICC had held not entitled to this exemption an association of 
wholesale automobile parts dealers organized and operated in good 
faith, on a nonprofit basis, for the purpose of effecting savings in 
freight charges for its members by securing the benefits of carload, 
truckload, or other volume rates. On the facts presented, the Su-
preme Court agreed with the district court216 that the ICC action 
was "without rational basis." The Court considered as decisive 
that no shipments by the association were ever undertaken except 
at the behest and for the benefit of a member. Looking to the 
agency between member and association, the Court saw no reason-
able ground for ruling that the association was on a profit basis, or 
that it was holding its service out to the general public.217 That 
being the case, the commission order had to be set aside, even 
under Gray v. Powell. 
More difficult to deal with are cases where the Court does not 
expressly avow that the challenged agency findings are without a 
rational basis. A recent case of this type is Thompson v. United 
States,218 where the Court set aside an order of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission finding that a "through route" existed be-
tween two points and directing the appellant railroad to provide 
214 338 U.S. 689, 70 S.Ct. 411 (1950). 
215 56 Stat. L. 285 (1942), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §1002 (c) (1). 
216 Pacific Coast Wholesalers' Assn. v. United States, (D.C. Cal. 1949) 81 F. Supp. 991. 
217 338 U.S. 689 at 691, 70 S.Ct. 411 (1950). 
21s 343 U.S. 549, 72 S.Ct. 978 (1952). 
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transportation over that route.219 The Court, in an opinion by 
Chief Justice Vinson, held that the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion had erred in finding that there was a "through route" in ex-
istence in the instant case. "We hold that the Commission's efforts 
to support its finding that a through route from Lenora to Omaha 
via the Burlington line already exists are inconsistent with the 
meaning of the term 'through route' as used in the Interstate Com-
merce Act. "220 What may seem like an arbitrary refusal to follow 
Gray v. Powell is, however, explained by the fact that, as Chief 
Justice Vinson explained in a companion case, no traffic whatever 
passed over the route found by the commission to constitute the 
already-existing "through route."221 Under these circumstances, 
the ICC's finding appears patently unreasonable, and hence sub-
ject to being set aside, regardless of the doctrine of Gray v. Powell. 
Other decisions of the highest Court which set aside agency 
findings of the Gray v. Powell type are also explainable, if at all, on 
the ground that the findings in question were unreasonable. In 
Norton v. Warner Co.,222 for example, compensation had been 
awarded under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Com-
pensation Act223 to one employed as a boatman on a barge which 
at the time of the injury was afloat on the navigable waters of the 
United States, despite the fact that the statute provided that it was 
not to apply to a "master or member of a crew of any vessel." The 
finding of the agency that the claimant did not come within the 
statutory exception was clearly of the kind involved in Gray v. 
Powell and, under that case, subject only to limited review. The 
Supreme Court held nonetheless that it should be set aside. That 
Justice Douglas tells us that his decision is based upon the prin-
ciple that the courts can reverse because of an agency misconstruc-
tion of a term of the act224 is not very helpful, for the same can be 
said in all the cases involving the Gray v. Powell doctrine. And 
that would, of course, permit the courts to review the rightness of 
agency constructions. At the same time, it seems to the present 
219 Under the Interstate Commerce Act, a carrier must not only provide transporta-
tion service at reasonable rates over its own lines but has the additional duty "to estab-
lish reasonable through routes with other such carriers, and just and reasonable rates ..• 
applicable thereto." 54 Stat. L. 900 (1940), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §1 (4). 
220 343 U.S. 549 at 560, 72 S.Ct. 978 (1952). 
221 United States v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 343 U.S. 562 at 573, 72 S.Ct. 985 (1952). 
222 321 U.S. 565, 64 S.Ct. 747 (1944). 
223 44 Stat. L. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. (1952) §901. 
224 321 U.S. 565 at 569, 64 S.Ct. 747 (1944). See Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328 at 334, 74 
S.Ct. 88 (1953). 
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writer, that the Court felt that, under the facts of the case, the 
agency finding was unreasonable. "If a barge . . . can have a 
'crew' within the meaning of the Act and if a 'crew' may consist of 
one man, we do not see why Rusin does not meet the require-
ments .... We know of no reason why a person in sole charge of 
a vessel on a voyage is not as much a 'member of the crew' as he 
would be if there were two or more aboard."225 That being true, 
said Justice Douglas, "We conclude that only by a distorted defini-
tion of the word 'crew' as used in the Act could [ the claimant be 
excluded from the term]."226 
A more recent case involving the same judicial approach is 
Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co.227 That case too grew out 
of a claim for compensation under the Longshoremen's Act. The 
relevant section of that statute provides, "The right to compensa-
tion for disability under this 'Act shall be barred unless !1- claim 
therefor is filed within one year after the injury .... "228 The claims 
here involved were filed from eighteen to twenty-four months 
from the dates the employees were injured. The deputy commis-
sioner held that the claims were nevertheless timely, since they 
had been filed within one year after the claimants had become 
disabled because of their injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed 
decisions below vacating the award.229 A reading of Justice Min-
ton's opinion leaves one with the impression that he felt that the 
agency finding, which construed the word "injury" in the statute 
to mean "disability" was not only not right, but also not reason-
able. "We are not free," said he, "under the guise of construc-
tion, to amend the statute by inserting therein before the word 
'injury' the word 'compensable' so as to make 'injury' read as if 
it were 'disability.' Congress knew the difference between 'dis-
ability' and 'injury' and used the words advisedly."23° For the 
agency to construe the two terms as interchangeable despite the 
fact that each was expressly defined differently in the statute231 
was for it to act without a rational basis. 
Primary role of lower courts. A Supreme Court decision which 
appears, at first glance, to be wholly inconsistent with the doctrine 
of Gray v. Powell is National Labor Relations Board v. American 
225 321 U.S. 565 at 571. 
226 Id. at 573. 
227 342 U.S. 197, 72 S.Ct. 233 (1952). 
22s 44 Stat. L. 1432, §13 (a) (1927), 33 U.S.C. (1952) §913 (a). 
229 (9th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 987; (D.C. Cal. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 898. 
230 342 U.S. 197 at 199, 72 S.Ct. 233 (1952). 
23144 Stat. L. 1425 (1927), 33 U.S.C. (1952) §902 (2), (10). 
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Insurance Co.232 The NLRB there had found that respondent 
had not bargained in "good faith" with its employees' represen-
tative, as was required by the Labor Act, as amended, 233 and 
ordered respondent so to bargain. The court of appeals, upon 
review, refused to enforce this portion of the Board's order, since 
it found that there had been no bad faith on respondent's part.234 
A reading of Chief Judge Hutcheson's opinion reveals no indica-
tion of any deference paid to the Board's application of the statu-
tory term "good faith" to the facts of the case, as is required by 
Gray v. Powell. The court seems rather to have substituted its 
judgment for that of the Board, whose finding was set aside as 
incorrect. 
Despite this apparent violation by the court of appeals of the 
Gray v. Powell doctrine, its refusal to enforce the Board brder ·was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Vinson admitted 
that the agency finding at issue involved the application of the 
statutory standard of good faith bargaining to the facts of this 
case.235 But, said he, the rule of National Labor Relations Board 
v. Pittsburgh S. S. Co.236 requires the Court to affirm. In the 
Pittsburgh S. S. case, the Court had indicated that the lower 
federal courts were henceforth to have the primary role in review-
ing administrative action. Were he called to pass upon the ad-
ministrative findings in the first instance, said Justice Frank-
furter, who delivered the Pittsburgh S. S. opinion, or to make an 
independent review of the review by the court of appeals, he might 
well support the Board's conclusion and reject that of the court 
below. But Congress has charged the courts of appeals, not the 
Supreme Court, with the normal and primary responsibility of 
review. This is not the place to review a conflict of evidence nor 
to reverse the court of appeals because "were we in its place we 
would find the record tilting one way rather than the other, though 
fair-minded judges could find it tilting either way."237 Or, to put 
it another way, henceforth the same degree of finality that is 
accorded to administrative findings by the courts of appeals will 
be accorded to the determinations of such courts on review by 
the Supreme Court. 
In its American Insurance decision, the Court applied the 
Pittsburgh S. S. rule to the Gray v. Powell type of case. "We 
232 343 U.S. 395, 72 S.Ct. 824 (1952). 
233 61 Stat. L. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (d). 
234 (5th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 307. 
235 343 U.S. 395 at 409, 72 S.Ct. 824 (1952). 
236 340 U.S. 498, 71 S.Ct. 453 (1951). 
237 Id. at 503. 
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repeat and reaffirm this rule," stated Chief Justice Vinson, "not-
ing its special applicability to cases where, as here, a statutory 
standard such as 'good faith' can have meaning only in its applica-
tion to the particular facts of a particular case."238 
The American Insurance case is consequently not inconsistent 
with Gray v. Powell. Instead, it tells us that the application of the 
doctrine of that case, like the application of the substantial-evi-
dence rule under the celebrated Universal Camera case239 is now 
the primary responsibility of the courts before whom review actions 
are brought initially. Unless their decisions on review are un-
reasonable, they will not be judicially interfered with from above. 
This is true even though the highest Court itself would have 
decided differently, had it been the original reviewing court. 
A more recent case explainable on the same basis as American 
Insurance is Thompson v. Lawson.240 It involved a claim for a 
death benefit by an alleged "widow" under the Longshoremen's 
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The claim was denied 
by the deputy commissioner who found that the claimant was not 
the "widow" of the decedent. The lower courts affirmed241 and 
their decisions were upheld by the Supreme Court. In a dissent, 
Justice Black asserted that the Court's decision was, in effect, 
contrary to Gray v. Powell. He based his view upon the fact that 
the deputy commissioner had entered his order against the claim-
ant because he felt bound by prior holdings of the Fifth Circuit 
that an attempted marriage by a wife barred her recovery of com-
pensation as a matter of law.242 Justice Black would have reversed 
with directions to remand the cause to the deputy commissioner 
to determine, free from judicial compulsion, whether, as a fact, 
petitioner's living apart was for "justifiable cause" or on account 
of her husband's "desertion." The decision of the Court, said he, 
nullified the primary right of the agency to apply the relevant 
statutory term to the facts of the case. "That the Court treats its 
holding as one of statutory1 construction cannot obscure the actual 
effect of what it is doing. The Court is taking from the deputy 
commissioners their congressionally granted power to determine 
from all, the facts and circumstances whether a widow is entitled 
to compensation."243 
238 343 U.S. 395 at 410, 72 S.Ct. 824 (1952). 
239 Supra note 48. 
240 347 U.S. 334, 74 S.Ct. 555 (1954). 
241 (5th Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 527. 
242 347 U.S. 334 at 338, 74 S.Ct. 555 (1954). 
243 Id. at 339. 
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Yet, even if Justice Black is correct in his view that the lower 
courts had refused to give the required deference to the agency 
findings, it does not follow from this that the Supreme Court must 
reverse. Under the American Insurance case, on the contrary, the 
decision of the original reviewing court must be affirmed, even if 
it involves an incorrect application of Gray v. Powell, provided 
that it is not unreasonable. Since, as Justice Black himself ad-
mitted, 244 the evidence was such that a finding either way could 
fairly have been made, the decision of the original reviewing court 
cannot be characterized as without a rational basis. 
Converse of Gray v. Powell. In Gray v. Powell, we have em-
phasized, the agency finding was one upon which its jurisdiction 
depended. Unless the petitioners in that case were not "pro-
ducers," the agency was wholly without regulatory power over 
them. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin245 indicates that the 
doctrine of Gray v. Powell does not apply to the converse type of 
case, i.e., one where an agency decides that it does not have juris-
diction over a particular individual and its decision is based upon 
a Gray v. Powell type finding. 
In the Phillips Petroleum case, the Federal Power Commission 
had found that the Phillips Company was not a "natural-gas" 
company within the meaning of that term as used in its enabling 
statute246 and therefore not within the commission's jurisdiction 
over rates. It consequently refused to proceed with an investiga-
tion it had instituted into the reasonableness of the rates charged 
by Phillips. In the Supreme Court, it was contended that the 
FPC's finding had·a reasonable basis in law and was supported by 
substantial evidence and therefore should be upheld under Gray 
v. Powell. That the commission finding was, at the very least, 
reasonable is shown by the fact that three dissenting justices in 
the Supreme Court247 thought that it was right. The majority 
of the Court nonetheless held that the FPC finding must be set 
aside as erroneous. The implication is that the Gray v. Powell 
doctrine will not be applied in such a case.248 Where the ad-
ministrative finding is one upon which the agency grounds a deci-
sion to assert its authority, the courts will defer to its judgment 
244 Id. at 338. 
245 347 U.S. 672, 74 S.Ct. 794 (1954). 
246 52 Stat. L. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §717. 
247 Justices Douglas, Clark, and Burton. 
248 The decision of the Supreme Court can also be justified by the rule of the Ameri-
can Insurance case, supra note 232, since it was affirming the decision of the court of 
appeals. And it should also be noted that the Court was influenced by the fact that the 
Federal Power Commission had been inconsistent in its interpretations of the statutory 
term at issue. 347 U.S. 672 at 678. 
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that regulatory power should be asserted. Where on the other 
hand, the administrative decision is one which declines jurisdic-
tion, the Phillips Petroleum case indicates that the courts may 
review fully the finding upon which the agency abnegation is 
based. 
Other cases. Two Supreme Court decisions involving the 
application of the Gray v. Powell doctrine cannot be explained on 
any of the grounds discussed above. The first of them is Railroad 
Retirement Board v. Duquesne Warehouse Co.249 The Railroad 
Retirement Act of 1937250 established a system of annuity, pen-
sion, and death benefits for employees of designated classes of 
employers. The Railroad Retirement Board adjudicates claims 
of eligible employees for the various types of benefits created by 
the act. The eligibility of an employee for such benefits is based 
on service to those included in the act's definition of "employer." 
The question arose whether the Duquesne Warehouse Co. was 
such an "employer." The Board after a hearing found that it was. 
Duquesne brought suit in the district court to compel the Board 
to set aside its order. That court rendered judgment for Du-
quesne.251 The court of appeals affirmed, by a divided vote.252 
The Supreme Court, in reversing the decisions below, made 
no mention whatsoever of the doctrine of Gray v. Powell or any 
of the cases following it. Instead, the opinion of Justice Douglas 
analyzes the statutory provisions and the facts and concludes, with-
out really referring to the agency finding or the deference to be 
paid to it, that the services performed by Duquesne made it an 
"employer" under the relevant act. Yet it seems clear, as Professor 
Davis points out, that this case is exactly like the already-discussed 
Hearst case,253 where the Court applied the Gray v. Powell doc-
trine to review of a National Labor Relations Board finding that 
certain newsboys were "employees." "The question whether ware-
house services were 'in connection with . . . transportation' seems 
analytically the same as the question whether newsboys were 'em-
ployees.' Both cases involved interpretation of statutory limitations 
on administrative jurisdiction. Both cases involved application of 
statutory language to undisputed facts. No reason appears for 
believing that the agency was more competent, or the Court less 
competent, to decide whether newsboys were employees than to 
249 326 U.S. 446, 66 S.Ct. 238 (1946). 
250 50 Stat. L. 307 (1937), 45 U.S.C. (1952) §228a. 
251 Duquesne Warehouse Co. v. Railroad Retirement Board, (D.C. N.Y. 1944) 56 F. 
Supp. 87. 
252 (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 473. 
253 Supra note 78. 
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decide whether the warehouse service was in connection with trans-
portation. Yet the scope of the judicial inquiry was apparently 
different in the two cases."254 Professor Davis's analysis seems in-
controvertible. But the Court in the Duquesne Warehouse case 
did not, as has been shown, appear to follow the doctrine of limited 
review or even refer to the Hearst case or Gray v. Powell at all. 
What makes the Court's failure to mention the Gray v. Powell 
doctrine even more aggravating 'is the fact that, in the court of 
appeals, there had been an intense dispute precisely over that 
doctrine. The majority opinion by Judge Hutcheson simply re-
fused to apply Gray v. Powell and similar cases so as to limit its 
review of the agency finding at issue. The contention of the Board 
that those cases required its finding to be upheld if it had only a 
rational basis was rejected as "heresy."255 Judge Frank, who dis-
sented, urged the applicability of the Hearst case.256 Despite the 
sharpness of the disagreemen_t below, the Supreme Court decided 
as it did, without any reference to Gray v. Powell, Hearst, or the 
dispute in the lower court itself-which, one would think, the 
Court would have felt called upon expressly to resolve. 
A case where the Court followed the same unsatisfactory ap-
proach as in its Duquesne Warehouse decision is Board of Gover-
nors v. Agnew.251 It involved review of an order of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System removing respondents 
from office as directors of a national bank on the ground that they 
were employees of a firm "primarily engaged" in underwriting 
within the meaning of the relevant section of the Banking Act of 
1933.258 Respondents were employees of a firm which received a 
substantial proportion of its ,income from underwriting, although 
its income from that source was never more than 39 percent of its 
total income. The court of appeals had set aside the Board's order 
on the ground that, since the firm's underwriting business did not 
by any quantitative test exceed 50 percent of its total business, 
it could not properly be found to be "primarily engaged" in the 
underwriting business.259 
The Supreme Court reversed, but, as in the Duquesne Ware-
house case, it did not confine itself to the question of whether 
the agency finding had a rational basis. Instead, it seems to have 
254 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 889 (1951). 
255148 F. (2d) 473 at 477. It is interesting to note that Jaffe, "Judicial Review: 
'Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,'" 64 HARV. L. REv. 1233 at 1258 (1951), has 
used the same characterization. 
256 148 F. (2d) 473 at 486-487. 
257 329 U.S. 441, 67 S.CL 411 (1946). 
258 48 Stat. L. 162 at 194 (1933), 12 U.S.C. (1952) §78. 
259 Agnew v. Board of Governors, (D.C. Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 785. 
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substituted its judgment for that of the agency on the question 
whether a company less than half of whose business was under-
writing was "primarily engaged in ... underwriting."260 Accord-
ing to Justice Douglas, "If the underwriting business of a firm is 
substantial, the firm is engaged in the underwriting business in a 
primary way, though by any quantitative test underwriting may 
not be its chief or principal activity. On the facts in this record 
we would find it hard to say that underwriting was not one primary 
activity of the firm."261 As was true in·Duquesne Warehouse, the 
Court's opinion nowhere refers to the doctrine of limited review 
or the Gray v. Powell line of cases. 
That the Court in the Agnew case was not following the Gray 
v. Powell doctrine of limited review is shown by the concurring 
opinion of Justice Rutledge. Like the majority of the Court, 
he agreed that the agency, rather than the lower court, should be 
upheld. He objected, however, to the implication of full review 
contained in the majority opinion. · .. 1 think it important ... ," 
said he, "to make clear that my concurrence in the Court's dis-
position of the case is based upon the ground I have set forth, and 
not upon independent judicial determination of the question pre-
sented on the merits. I do not think this Court or any other should 
undertake to reconsider, as an independent judgment, the Board's 
determination upon that question or similar ones likely to arise, 
if the Board was not without basis in fact for its judgment and 
does not clearly transgress a statutory mandate."262 
In both the Duquesne Warehouse and Agnew cases, it should 
be noted, the Supreme Court upheld agency findings which had 
been reversed by courts of appeals. It may well be that the Court 
felt called upon to demonstrate, not only the reasonableness, but 
also the rightness of the challenged findings because of this fact.263 
The lower courts had held that an independent warehouse com-
pany could not be found to be an "employer" under the Railroad 
Retirement Act nor could a firm, less than half of. whose business 
was in underwriting, be found to be "primarily engaged" in under-
writing. In view of these express court of appeals decisions, the 
260 See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 897 (1951). 
261 329 U.S. 441 at 446, 67 S.Ct. 411 (1946). 
262 Id. at 451. According to Black, J., dissenting, in Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 at 
484, 72 S.Ct. 433 (1952), that case also involved an unjustified refusal by the Court to 
follow the Gray v. Powell doctrine. It seems to the present writer, however, that that 
doctrine was not relevant in the Stark case, which involved the question of whether the 
enabling act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to deduct certain payments to coop-
eratives from the prices paid to milk producers. 
263 It should, however, be pointed out that in Gray v. Powell itself, the Court also 
upheld an agency finding which bad been reversed by the court of appeals. Yet this did 
not lead the Court to grant other than limited review there. 
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highest Court may have felt it necessary to show, not only that 
the agency constructions of the acts were reasonable, but also that 
it would have construed the statutes similarly had the cases orig-
inally come before it. Thus, the Court in the Agnew case was 
showing, to use its own words, that the agency construction of 
the act "is, we think, not only permissible but also more consonant 
with the legislative purpose than the construction which the Court 
of Appeals adopted."264 
Yet, even if the above explains why the Court acted as it did 
in Duquesne Warehouse and Agnew, it is difficult to see why the 
doctrine of Gray v. Powell was referred to in neither case. If the 
Court was consciously adhering to that doctrine while, at the 
same time, stating in detail its agreement with the correctness of 
the administrative findings in order to buttress the agencies, whose 
views had been rejected below, with the express accord of the na-
tion's highest tribunal,265 it would certainly seem reasonable to 
expect the Court to tell us so. And this was particularly true in 
the Duquesne Warehouse case where, as we have seen, there was 
a sharp division in the court of appeals on the applicability and, 
indeed, even on the validity of the Gray v. Powell doctrine. That 
the Supreme Court, on the contrary, said nothing about that doc-
trine or the cases following it may indicate that it was actually 
doing what it seemed to be doing in Duquesne Warehouse and 
Agnew-namely, fully reviewing the challenged agency findings. 
Yet if that is true, those cases are most disconcerting, because they 
do not contain any factors, such as those already discussed, which 
appear to differentiate them from Gray v. Powell. In the absence 
of any explanation by the Court to the contrary, we must con-
clude that they constitute mere aberrations from the Gray v. 
Powell doctrine. Nor should their practical importance, at least 
in their specific effects, be overemphasized. Both cases reached 
the same result as that required under Gray v. Powell, i.e., the 
upholding of the agency findings. 
Conclusion 
In a recent article, Professor Jaffe has rejected the Gray v. 
Powell doctrine as "heresy." Referring to Gray v. Powell and the 
264 329 U.S. 441 at 447 (1946) . 
.265 Such an approach may also explain an aspect of the Hearst case, supra note 78, 
that has troubled commentators, namely, the lengthy dissertation by the Court there in 
the first portion of its opinion to demonstrate its concurrence with the agency view that its 
finding on the question whether newsboys were "employees" under the relevant statute 
need not necessarily be governed by the common-law test to determine the existence of 
an employment relationship. Since the court of appeals had held in that case that the 
common-law test was controlling, the Court may have felt it desirable to state expressly 
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H earst266 and Dobson261 cases, he states, "There are expressions 
in these cases which suggest that Congress, merely by the use of 
a 'broad statutory term' to be applied from case to case, ,has there-
by delegated to the agency the power to determine what considera-
tions are relevant in applying it. In this connection it is of course 
admitted that if the concept of relevancy which is chosen is un-
reasonable the courts may censor it. But it is said that if the judg-
ment is reasonable the courts are powerless to interfere, though 
independently they would have arrived at a different conclusion. 
This, in my opinion, is heresy."268 
It is perhaps unnecessary to state that the present writer shares 
Professor Jaffe's view. The doctrine of Gray v. Powell is incon-
sistent with the very basis of the law of judicial review in the 
Anglo-American world. From almost the beginning of our ad-
ministrative law, review has focussed upon two main questions: 
that of jurisdiction and that of proper application of the law. 
The courts have left questions of fact for the administrator, sub-
ject only to limited review. Ensuring that agencies remain within 
the limits of their delegated powers and that they have not mis-
construed the law has, on the contrary, been conceived of as a 
judicial function. Yet, under Gray v. Powell, both statutory con-
struction and the determination of agency jurisdiction are taken 
from the reviewing court and vested primarily in the administrator. 
Nor are the essential effects of the Gray v. Powell doctrine 
altered by the characterization of a disputed agency finding as only 
one of "fact"269 or as involving merely the application, and not 
the interpretation, of a statute. Much as courts and commentators 
may seek to obscure ·it, nothing they say can change_ the fact that 
a finding like that at issue in Gray v. Powell has both legal and 
factual elements. And, as a leading supporter of the doctrine of 
limited review concedes, it does involve a question of statutory 
interpretation. "Analytically, the question [in Gray v. Powell] 
whether/Seaboard was a 'producer' was at least in part a question 
not only of law but also of statutory interpretation-a question 
of the meaning of the term 'producer.' "270 
that the agency was not only reasonable, but also right, in holding that the statute did not 
import the common-law test. 
266 Supra note 78 • 
.267 Supra note 82. , 
.268 Jaffe, "Judicial Review: 'Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record'," 64 HARv. 
L. R.Ev. 1233 at 1258 (1951). 
269 As was done by the Court in O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504, 71 
S.Ct. 470 (1951). 
270DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 883 (1951). 
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The proper approach to the Gray v. Powell type of finding is 
that of the late Master of the Rolls in In re Butler,271 an im-
portant English case. At issue in it was an administrative finding 
that certain buildings were "houses" rather than "other build-
ings," under the relevant section of the Housing Act, 1936.272 
"It seems. to me," said Lord Greene in the course of his opinion, 
"that these buildings properly fall under the word 'houses' in the 
section. Whether a particular building does or does not fall under 
that word is.a mixed question of law and fact; fact in so far as it 
is necessary to ascertain all the relevant facts relating to the build-
ing, and law in so far as the application of the word 'houses' to 
those facts involves the construction of the Act."273 
Under Lord Greene's view, the reviewing court may use its own 
independent judgment with regard to the application of the statu-
tory term to the particular factual situation. Due weight is to be 
given to the administrative ascertainment of the facts, but it is for 
the court to determine whether those facts come within the statu-
tory concept. This was the approach taken by the Master of the 
Rolls in the Butler case, where he decided whether or not the build-
ings in question were "houses" on the basis of the facts as found by 
the administrative body. "As so frequently happens in dealing with 
Acts of Parliament, words are found used-and very often the com-
moner the word is, the greater doubt it may raise-the application 
of which to individual cases can only be settled by the application 
of a sense of language in the context of the Act, and if I may say 
so, a certain amount of common sense in using and understanding 
the English language in a particular context. There may, of course, 
be cases which fall very near a borderline, and it is impossible to 
lay down any exhaustive definition as to what is or is not a house. 
Every case must be considered in the light of its own facts, but in 
the present case I am of opinion that these buildings come under 
the word 'houses.' "274 To the present writer, at least, the approach 
of Lord Greene seems far preferable to that followed by our Su-
preme Court in the Gray v. Powell line of cases. 
While the judicial refusal in this country to concede that statu-
tory interpretation is involved in the Gray v. Powell type of case 
cannot obscure the fact that such interpretation is involved, it 
must be conceded that it has enabled the highest Court to all but 
271 [1939] 1 K.B. 570. 
27226 Geo. V and 1 Edw. VIII, c. 51, §25. 
273 [1939] 1 K.B. 570 at 579. 
274lbid. 
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nullify language in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946275 
which can be said to eliminate the Gray v. Powell doctrine. Under 
that statute, "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant ques-
tions of law, interpret ... statutory provisions."276 Since, as has 
already been shown, the Gray v. Powell type of finding does con-
tain legal elements and involves statutory interpretation, it can be 
claimed that this provision of the procedure act eliminates the 
doctrine of narrow review in the Gray v. Powell situation.277 The 
Suprem_e Court has, however, avoided this result by its refusal to 
concede that an agency finding of the kind under discussion in-
volves statutory interpretation. In O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-
Maxon, Inc.,218 on the contrary, the Court held that a finding that 
a death arose "out of and in the course of employment" was one 
of "fact," whose review was governed by the substantial-evidence 
rule. By its use of its power to classify challenged agency findings, 
the Court has been able to maintain the Gray v. Powell doctrine 
unaltered, despite the seemingly contrary language of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.279 
It must, of course, be emphasized that the question of the desir-
ability of the Gray v. Powell doctrine and that of its application are 
two entirely different things. Even if, like the present writer, one 
doubts the soundness of the doctrine and hopes for its ultimate 
repudiation, he can still desire, so long as it is not overruled, ~o see 
it applied in a logically consistent fashion. To one concerned with 
the law, not necessarily as pure logic, but at least as a rational sci-
ence, there is nothing more disconcerting than a doctrine which is 
sometimes followed and sometimes not, with the choice in particu-
lar cases dependent more or less upon judicial caprice. 
That is why the embarrassingly large number of Supreme Court 
decisions that do not adhere to the doctrine of Gray v. Powell is of 
275 60 Stat. L. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1001. 
276 Section 10 ( e). 
277 See, e.g., DICKINSON, THE JUDICIAL REvrEW PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL ADMINIS· 
TRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr (SECTION 10): BACKGROUND AND EFFECT, IN THE FEDERAL ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 546, 585, Warren ed. (1947). 
278 340 U.S. 504, 71 S.Ct. 470 (1951). 
279 The ineffectiveness of the Administrative Procedure Act in doing away with the 
Gray v. Powell doctrine has led the Hoover Commission task force on administrative law 
to recommend in its recent report that that act be amended to allow the reviewing court 
to "determine all relevant. questions of law and interpret any constitutional and statutory 
provisions involved, and it shall apply such determination to the facts duly found or 
established, whether or not such court is the trier of the facts." COMMISSION ON ORGANIZA-
TION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERV-
ICES AND PROCEDURE 218, 374 (1955). The Brown-Pacific-Maxon case would seem to indi-
cate that some such amendment will be necessary before the Procedure Act will have any 
real effect upon the doctrine of Gray v. Powell. 
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such concern to the student of administrative law. Unless they 
can be explained upon a rational basis, the law of his subject is, to 
say the least, in a most unsatisfactory state. 
In the analysis which has been given in this article of the deci-
sions which do not appear to follow the Gray v. Powell doctrine, 
it has, it is believed, been shown that the vast majority of those 
decisions are not really inconsistent with Gray v. Powell. And that 
is true because, in all but two of the decisions analyzed,280 there 
were present factors which might logically induce the reviewing 
court to decline to defer to the challenged agency finding. All of 
these factors were logically inherent in Gray v. Powell itself as that 
case was decided by the highest Court and the presence of any of 
them in a case should make for the non-application of the doctrine 
of limited review. 
The cases which have been discussed indicate that the doctrine 
of Gray v. Powell will not be followed: 
1. Where the challenged agency finding has not been made in 
a specific contested case after a full, formal adversary hearing.281 
2. Where the challenged finding is inconsistent with other 
administrative interpretations, whether made by the same or by 
other agencies.282 
3. Where the finding at issue is one upon which the agency 
bases a decision that it does not have jurisdiction in the particular 
case.283 
In addition, it should of course be realized that, even under the 
doctrine of limited review, the courts can inquire into the reason-
ableness of challenged findings. Gray v. Powell type findings will 
consequently be set aside, upon review, 
4. Where the court finds that they are without a rational 
basis.284 
The American Insurance decision285 adds a further factor which 
is needed to explain some of the recent Supreme Court cases, which 
otherwise might seem inconsistent with Gray v. Powell. The high-
est Court will not reverse decisions below setting aside agency 
findings 
280 Railroad Retirement Board v. Duquesne Warehouse Co., supra note 249, and 
Board of Governors v. Agnew, supra note 257. 
281 Pp. 39-45 supra. 
282 Pp. 45-55 supra. 
283 Pp. 61-62 supra. 
284 Pp. 56-58 supra. 
285 Note 232 supra. 
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5. Where the action of the original reviewing court is reason-
able, even though the Supreme Court itself, had the review action 
come before it initially, would have upheld the agency finding 
under the doctrine of Gray v. Powell.286 
The presence in them of one or more of the above-listed factors 
explains the non-application of the doctrine of limited review in 
practically all the cases which have been discussed. The use of 
these factors to explain the judicial failure to follow Gray v. Powell 
transforms the doctrine of that case from one whose application 
depends on the vagaries of the highest Court to one which is ap-
plied in a more or less logical and consistent manner. And, if that 
is the case, it is a doctrine which, whatever the doubts that one 
may have as to its ultimate desirability, is a workable one whose 
application or non-application can be predicted upon logical prin-
ciples. 
It is true that the criteria which have been emphasized in this 
paper as those upon which the use of the Gray v. Powell doctrine 
turns are not those which other writers on the subject have urged. 
But it is also true that other writers have been able to explain only 
a small proportion of the Supreme Court decisions which appear 
inconsistent with Gray v. Powell, relegating the unexplained cases 
to the limbo of uncontrolled judicial discretion. More disconcert-
ing perhaps is the fact that the Supreme Court itself has not articu-
lated the tests urged by the present writer as the factors which have 
induced it not to follow the doctrine of limited review. The failure 
of the Court itself to give any real explanation of its seemingly 
arbitrary refusals to adhere to Gray v. Powell does, it must be con-
ceded, make matters most difficult for those who seek to analyze 
the jurisprudence of the highest tribunal. The Court's dereliction 
does not, however, preclude attempts at such analysis by outside 
observers. Nor are their analyses-otherwise workable-rendered 
invalid because they do not coincide with what, if anything, the 
Court has said on the subject. On the contrary, so far as the subject 
under discussion in this article is concerned, it is almost essential 
for the commentator to rely more upon his own analysis than upon 
what little the Court has said. For, if one had to rely only upon 
the Court's statements with regard to the application of the doc-
rine of Gray v. Powell, he would most certainly have to declare, 
with Mark Twain and Justice Jackson, "The more you explain it, 
the more I don't understand it." 
286 Pp. 58-61 supra. 
